Other Canada Pension Plan (CPP)

Decision Information

Decision Content



Reasons and decision

Decision

[1] Leave to appeal is refused.

Overview

[2] This appeal is about the extent to which the law permits retroactive payment of the Disabled Contributor’s Child’s Benefit (DCCB). For more than two years, the Applicant, R. C., was unaware that W. M., the estranged father of her daughter, had applied for, and was subsequently granted, disability benefits under the Canada Pension Plan (CPP). On October 14, 2016, after this information came to light, the Applicant applied for the DCCB on behalf of her daughter. The Respondent approved her application with an effective payment date of November 2015, which it determined was the fullest period of retroactivity permitted under the law.

[3] The Applicant appealed this decision to the General Division of the Social Security Tribunal of Canada (Tribunal). She argued that, while she understood there was a general rule that limited retroactive DCCB payments to 11 months prior to application, her daughter’s circumstances were unique and required special consideration. First, she suggested that Mr. W. M. had intentionally failed to disclose their daughter on his disability application. Second, she pleaded that she was a single parent of four children with many expenses.

[4] The General Division dismissed the appeal, finding nothing in the CPP that permitted it to award further back payments. The Applicant is now requesting leave to appeal to the Tribunal’s Appeal Division, alleging that the General Division erred in rendering its decision.

[5] For the following reasons, I see no reasonable chance of success for this appeal.

Issue

[6] Does the Applicant make an arguable case that the General Division erred in limiting her to 11 months of retroactive DCCB payments?

Analysis

[7] As much as I may sympathize with the Applicant’s financial plight, my hands are tied by the CPP and the laws that govern the Tribunal.

[8] There are only three grounds of appeal to the Appeal Division: The General Division (i) failed to observe a principle of natural justice; (ii) erred in law; or (iii) based its decision on an erroneous finding of fact made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material. An appeal may be brought only if the Appeal Division first grants leave to appeal.Footnote 1 Leave to appeal will be granted if the Appeal Division is satisfied that the appeal has a reasonable chance of success.Footnote 2 As the Federal Court of Appeal has determined, a reasonable chance of success is akin to an arguable case at law.Footnote 3

[9] The General Division correctly noted that paragraph 74(2)(b) of the CPP limits payment of the DCCB to no earlier than “the twelfth month preceding the month following the month the application was received.” The Applicant submitted the DCCB application in October 2016. As a result, she was statute-barred from receiving more than 11 months of retroactive payments following approval of her application.

[10] The Applicant alleges that the General Division failed to address evidence that Mr. W. M. deliberately omitted his daughter’s name from his June 2014 CPP disability application. My review of its decision indicates that the General Division was aware of this allegation but determined that it had no bearing on the question of retroactive DCCB payment. The issue then became whether the General Division had the discretion to order what it considered to be a fair result. In the end, it decided that it did not, and I see no arguable case that it erred in arriving at this conclusion.

[11] In this case, the General Division confirmed that the Respondent correctly followed the CPP in determining the Applicant’s entitlement to the DCCB. It then determined that it lacked the jurisdiction to consider equitable grounds such as the financial needs of the Applicant’s daughter or the possible misconduct by her father. It did not have the power to go beyond that.

[12] As administrative tribunals, both the General Division and the Appeal Division are limited to the powers conferred by their enabling legislation—in this case, the DESDA. They lack the authority to simply ignore the letter of the law and order a solution that we think is fair. This power, known as “equity,” has traditionally been reserved to the courts, although they will typically exercise it only if there is no adequate remedy at law. Canada v. Tucker,Footnote 4 among many other cases, has confirmed that an administrative tribunal is not a court but a statutory decision-maker and, therefore, not empowered to provide any form of equitable relief.

Conclusion

[13] As the Applicant has not identified any grounds of appeal that would have a reasonable chance of success on appeal, the application for leave to appeal is refused.

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