Other Canada Pension Plan (CPP)

Decision and Reasons

Decision

[1] The appeal is dismissed.

Overview

[2] Y. L. (Appellant) and the late J. W. (Added Party) were married in June 1963, separated in May 1990, and divorced in May 1995. In September 2006, the Added Party applied for a division of unadjusted pensionable earnings under the Canada Pension Plan (CPP), something that is commonly known as a credit split. The Respondent, the Minister of Employment and Social Development (Minister), informed the Appellant of the proposed credit split, and the Appellant agreed that the dates above were correct. Ultimately, the Minster performed the credit split in November 2006, which caused the Appellant’s Canada Pension Plan retirement pension to go down by over $100/month.

[3] After the Added Party’s passing in April 2016, the Appellant asked that his pension credits be returned to him since the Added Party could no longer benefit from them. The Minister interpreted the Appellant’s letter as a request that it cancel the November 2006 credit split, but it said that it had no power to do so.

[4] The Minister maintained its decision on reconsideration, and the General Division summarily dismissed the Appellant’s appeal of the Minister’s reconsideration decision. In short, the General Division concluded that credit splits are mandatory and permanent in most cases, including this one. Concerning the Appellant’s allegation that he had received incomplete information from the Minister at the time of the 2006 credit split, the General Division concluded that it had no jurisdiction over that issue.

[5] The Appellant now seems to be arguing that the result in his case is unfair and repeats his allegation that the Minister failed to inform him in 2006 and 2007 that the credit split would be permanent. I understand the Appellant’s frustration, but I have concluded that his appeal must be dismissed for the reasons below.

Method of proceeding

[6] In keeping with section 37(a) of the Social Security Tribunal Regulations (SST Regulations), I decided this appeal based on the documents already on file because:

1. a) the relevant facts are clear;
2. b) the legal issues the appeal raises are not complex; and
3. c) section 3(1)(a) of the SST Regulations says that the Tribunal’s proceedings should be conducted as informally and quickly as circumstances, fairness, and natural justice allow.

[7] Since the General Division summarily dismissed the Appellant’s appeal, he does not require leave (or permission) to appeal in this case. Neither the Minister nor the Added Party has filed submissions on the merits of this appeal.

Issue

[8] Has the Appellant established a ground of appeal that justifies the Appeal Division’s intervention in this case?

Analysis

The Appeal Division’s Legal Framework

[9] To succeed at the Appeal Division, the Appellant must show that the General Division committed at least one of the errors (or grounds of appeal) listed under section 58(1) of the Department of Employment and Social Development Act (DESD Act). Generally speaking, the recognized errors concern whether the General Division:

1. a) breached a principle of natural justice or made an error relating to its jurisdiction;
2. b) rendered a decision that contains an error of law; or
3. c) based its decision on an erroneous finding of fact that it made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it.

[10] When considering the degree of scrutiny with which I should review the General Division decision, I have focused on the language set out in the DESD Act.^{Footnote 1} More specifically, any breach of a principle of natural justice, any jurisdictional error, and any error of law could justify my intervention. Concerning errors of fact, however, section 58(1)(c) of the DESD Act states that I can intervene only if the General Division based its decision on an erroneous finding of fact and if that erroneous finding was made in a perverse or capricious way or without regard for the material that the General Division had before it. The Federal Court of Appeal described erroneous findings of fact as ones that squarely contradict or are unsupported by the evidence.^{Footnote 2}

Has the Appellant established a ground of appeal that justifies the Appeal Division’s intervention in this case?

[11] In short, the Appellant is arguing that the General Division:^{Footnote 3}

1. breached a principle of natural justice because the Appellant’s friends and acquaintances are shocked to learn that the Appellant’s pension credits cannot be returned to him following the death of his ex-wife; and
2. based its decision on an erroneous finding of fact because the Minister failed to inform him in its letters from 2006 and 2007 that the credit split would be permanent.

[12] In my view, none of the Appellant’s arguments fall within the recognized grounds of appeal under section 58(1) of the DESD Act. As a result, I have no power to intervene in this case.

[13] When assessing whether the General Division breached a principle of natural justice, the focus is normally on the process that the General Division adopted. For example, did the parties know the case they had to meet, were they given a fair and reasonable opportunity to present their case, and was the General Division decision free from bias or the reasonable apprehension of bias?

[14] Respectfully, no natural justice concerns arise from the fact that the Appellant’s friends and acquaintances might be surprised by the outcome of his case.

[15] As the General Division stated, this Tribunal must apply the relevant provisions of the CPP as they are written. The Tribunal has no power to overlook the terms of the CPP, even if doing so could lead to an outcome that some might consider more fair or just.^{Footnote 4}

[16] Regarding the Appellant’s alleged error of fact, the General Division did not ignore or misunderstand the Appellant’s evidence or assertions. To the contrary, the General Division specifically recognized in paragraph 8 of its decision that the December 2006 and February 2007 letters from Service Canada did not inform the Appellant that the credit split would be permanent, and the General Division acknowledged the Appellant’s assertion that he would have appealed the Minister’s decision if he had had that information earlier.

[17] The General Division dealt with these points in its analysis by saying that:

1. The Appellant’s challenge, even if brought in 2006 or 2007, would have been hopeless because the relevant provisions of the CPP establish that, once the Minister received the Added Party’s application and supporting documents, the credit split in this case was mandatory and permanent; and
2. The Appellant’s claim that his pension credits should be returned because of the incomplete information that the Minister provided to him in 2006 and 2007 amounts to an allegation that he was the victim of erroneous advice or an administrative error. However, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over such issues.

[18] As a result, I cannot conclude that the General Division based its decision on an erroneous finding of fact, as described in section 58(1)(c) of the DESD Act. Rather, I interpret the Appellant’s notice of appeal as simply rearguing his case in hopes of getting a different result, but the Appeal Division’s limited role does not allow me to simply decide the case afresh.^{Footnote 5}

[19] As mentioned above, the Appeal Division intervenes in a case only if it finds that the General Division committed at least one of the recognized errors under section 58(1) of the DESD Act. In my view, none of those errors were committed here. Indeed, the General Division’s conclusions are well supported by the relevant provisions of the CPP and by binding court decisions.

Conclusion

[20] In closing, I would simply note that the Canada Pension Plan is not a social welfare scheme, but a contributory plan in which Parliament has set all of the relevant terms, including how pension credits are to be divided if a couple separates or divorces.^{Footnote 6} Like other public schemes, some people will receive more benefits from the Canada Pension Plan than others. In fact, even though the Appellant’s retirement pension decreased after the credit split, the overall benefits that he receives from the Canada Pension Plan could still exceed what he paid into it.

[21] The appeal is dismissed.