Employment Insurance (EI)

Reasons and decision

Persons in attendance

[1] The Appellant, E. T., was present at the teleconference held on November 17, 2015. The hearing was adjourned to enable the Canada Social Security Tribunal (“the Tribunal)” to conduct certain checks on preliminary matters raised in connection with the issue in this case. A new hearing date was set for November 19, 2015, and the Appellant was present at the teleconference held on that date.

Introduction

[2] On February 4, 2013, the Appellant filed a renewal claim for benefits effective September 15, 2013. The Appellant reported that he had worked for the employer Le Capitole de Québec inc. (Restaurant Chez l’Autre) until August 23, 2013 and had stopped working for that employer due to a shortage of work (Exhibits GD3-3 to GD3-17).

[3] On March 18, 2015, the Respondent, the Canada Employment Insurance Commission (“the Commission”), informed the Appellant that it could not pay him EI regular benefits as of August 18, 2013 because he had voluntarily stopped working for his employer on August 23, 2013 without just cause within the meaning of the Employment Insurance Act (“the Act”). The Commission further told the Appellant that he had failed to report his earnings and to inform it that he had voluntarily left his employment. It also notified the Appellant that he had not reported his income from the employer Le Capitole de Québec inc. as earnings. It indicated that it had adjusted his total income for the week starting May 12, 2013 and stated that the Appellant had not responded to the request for information it had sent him. The Commission concluded that the Appellant had knowingly made two false statements, for which he was assessed a $712.00 penalty. The Commission also issued a notice of “serious violation” to the Appellant (Exhibits GD3-28 to GD3-31).

[4] On May 7, 2015, the Appellant filed a Request for Reconsideration of an Employment Insurance Decision (Exhibits GD3-35 to GD3-37).

[5] On June 9, 2015, the Commission notified the Appellant that it was upholding the decision rendered in his case on April 20, 2015 concerning his voluntary leaving and earnings (allocation of earnings). The Commission informed the Appellant that it had revised its position in his favour with respect to the penalty imposed on him and the notice of violation issued against him, finding that the Appellant had not deliberately made false statements (Exhibits GD3-40 and GD3-41).

[6] On July 9, 2015, the Appellant filed a notice of appeal with the Employment Insurance Section of the Tribunal’s General Division (Exhibits G2-1 to GD2-4).

[7] This appeal was heard by the teleconference form of hearing for the following reasons:

1. The information in the file, including the need for additional information;
2. This method of proceeding respects the requirement under the Social Security Tribunal Regulations to proceed as informally and quickly as circumstances, fairness and natural justice permit. (Exhibits GD1-1 to GD1-4).

Issues

[8] The Tribunal must determine whether the Appellant had just cause for voluntarily leaving his employment under sections 29 and 30 of the Act.

[9] The Tribunal notes that the appeal instituted by the Appellant concerns the voluntary leaving even issue only, even though the Commission rendered a reconsideration decision on the allocation of earnings (Exhibits GD3-40 and GD3-41).

The law

[10] The provisions respecting voluntary leaving are set forth in sections 29 and 30 of the Act.

[11] For the application of sections 30 to 33 of the Act respecting disqualification from receiving employment insurance benefits in the case of “leaving without just cause”, paragraph 29(c) of the Act provides:

(c) just cause for voluntarily leaving an employment or taking leave from an employment exists if the claimant had no reasonable alternative to leaving or taking leave, having regard to all the circumstances, including any of the following: (i) sexual or other harassment, (ii) obligation to accompany a spouse, common-law partner or dependent child to another residence, (iii) discrimination on a prohibited ground of discrimination within the meaning of the Canadian Human Rights Act, (iv) working conditions that constitute a danger to health or safety, (v) obligation to care for a child or a member of the immediate family, (vi) reasonable assurance of another employment in the immediate future, (vii) significant modification of terms and conditions respecting wages or salary, (viii) excessive overtime work or refusal to pay for overtime work, (ix) significant changes in work duties, (x) antagonism with a supervisor if the claimant is not primarily responsible for the antagonism, (xi) practices of an employer that are contrary to law, (xii) discrimination with regard to employment because of membership in an association, organization or union of workers, (xiii) undue pressure by an employer on the claimant to leave their employment, and (xiv) any other reasonable circumstances that are prescribed.

[12] Subsections 30(1) and (2) of the Act provide as follows with respect to “disqualification” from receiving benefits:

(1) A claimant is disqualified from receiving any benefits if the claimant lost any employment because of their misconduct or voluntarily left any employment without just cause, unless (a) the claimant has, since losing or leaving the employment, been employed in insurable employment for the number of hours required by section 7 or 7.1 to qualify to receive benefits; or (b) the claimant is disentitled under sections 31 to 33 in relation to the employment. (2) The disqualification is for each week of the claimant’s benefit period following the waiting period and, for greater certainty, the length of the disqualification is not affected by any subsequent loss of employment by the claimant during the benefit period.

[13] As regards “disentitlement” in the event of “anticipated loss of employment”, section 33 of the Act provides as follows:

(1) A claimant is not entitled to receive benefits if the claimant loses an employment because of their misconduct or voluntarily leaves without just cause within three weeks before (a) the expiration of a term of employment, in the case of employment for a set term; or (b) the day on which the claimant is to be laid off according to a notice already given by the employer to the claimant. (2) The disentitlement lasts until the expiration of the term of employment or the day on which the claimant was to be laid off.

Evidence

[14] The evidence in the file is as follows:

1. A Record of Employment dated June 17, 2014, states that the Appellant worked for the employer, Le Capitole de Québec inc., from May 17 to August 23, 2013 inclusive and that he stopped working for that employer after voluntarily leaving it (Exhibit GD3-18);
2. In a document entitled “Request for Payroll Information,” dated October 1, 2014, the employer reported that the Appellant had told it he was moving (Exhibits GD3-19 and GD3-20);
3. On December 29, 2014, the Commission informed the Appellant that it understood he had voluntarily left his employment with the employer, Le Capitole de Québec inc., and indicated that, according to its files, the Appellant had not reported that voluntary leaving to it and asked him to complete the form it had sent him so that he could provide an explanation of the situation (Exhibits GD3-21 to GD3-27);
4. In two documents entitled “Details of the Notice of Debt (DH009),” dated March 21, 2015 and reproduced on August 3, 2015, the Appellant’s total amount of debt was established at $2,135.00. Those documents indicate that the amount of the overpayment as a result of the disqualification imposed on the Appellant was established at $1,380.00 (Exhibits GD3-32 and GD3-33);
5. On June 2, 2015, the employer reported that the Appellant had been hired for the summer but that there was no scheduled end date of the employment, since everything depended on the workload. The employer indicated that the Appellant would not have remained employed on a full-time basis but would perhaps have continued to work part time, as required (Exhibit GD3-39);
6. On November 19, 2015, the Appellant sent the Tribunal a copy of the decision rendered by the Quebec Court of Appeal in Fruits de mer Gascons Ltée c. Commission des normes du travail, Quebec Court of Appeal, March 15, 2004, to show that he had had a fixed-term contract with the employer, Le Capitole de Québec inc. (Restaurant Chez l’Autre) (Exhibits GD6-1 to GD6-11).

[15] The evidence adduced at the hearing is as follows:

1. The Appellant recalled the circumstances in which he voluntarily left his employment with the employer, Le Capitole de Québec inc. (Restaurant Chez l’Autre), on August 23, 2013 because he had accepted a job for the summer and was going back to his studies;
2. He said he would send the Tribunal new documents on the concept of fixed-term contracts (decision in Fruits de mer Gascons Ltée c. Commission des normes du travail, Quebec Court of Appeal, March 15, 2004) (Exhibits GD6-1 to GD6-11).

Parties’ arguments

[16] The Appellant presented the following arguments and submissions:

1. He contended that he had had a fixed-term contract with the employer, that the exception provided for in section 33 of the Act was applicable to his case and that the contract with his employer had been made orally. He emphasized that he had worked in several restaurants and that there were no written contracts in the restaurant business. He stated that he did not need an employment end date to show that he had a fixed-term contract. He said that, based on his experience, summer in that business ended on Labour Day, which, in 2013, fell on September 3. He noted that his employment was a fixed-term job since he was certain he would be moving to X to begin his master’s studies and to continue looking for a position as a lawyer (Exhibits GD3-36 and GD3-37);
2. He contended that his contract therefore commenced on his first day of work, May 17, 2013 (Exhibit GD3-18) and was to end on September 2, 2013 (Labour Day weekend);
3. He explained that, when he was hired and at the end of his employment, he was in communication with the restaurant manager, L. T. He said he had agreed with the latter on a specific employment start date and that he would work as a server for the summer only or for the duration of the summer period, considering that he would be moving to X at the end of August 2013 to begin a master’s program in law. He noted that no specific employment end date had been discussed with his employer when he was hired. He said there had been no talk that his employment might continue after the summer period and that his employer was aware of that situation. He emphasized that the parties’ intention was clear on that point at the time he was hired (Exhibits GD3-36 to GD3-38);
4. He stated that, to his knowledge, the employer was looking for summer staff only and that he had been prepared to be available for precisely that period of time. The Appellant emphasized that his employer knew he would be going to study in X at the end of August 2013, that the employer also knew he was looking for full-time employment as a lawyer and that he might leave at any moment if he found something (Exhibits GD3-36 to GD3-38);
5. He indicated that he had not discussed the employment’s end date at the time he was hired because the matter did not arise since everyone knew he would be leaving at the end of August 2013 (Exhibit GD3-38);
6. He contended that, despite the employer’s statement to that effect, there was never any talk with the employer of him continuing to work, on a part-time or any other basis. He said he did not know the person who had made that statement to the Commission (F. P.), that he had never spoken to her and that his contract had not been established with her but rather with L. T. He contended that Ms. F. P.’s statements were immaterial to this case (Exhibit GD3-39);
7. He explained that he chose to leave his employment on August 23, 2013 because he was going to start his master’s program at the University of X at the end of August 2013 and that he had to relocate. He said that he had not known the extent to which this element was material to the case;
8. He explained that he had voluntarily left his employment within the three-week period preceding the end of his employment contract on September 2, 2013;
9. He argued that, under subsection 33(1) of the Act, he was eligible for employment insurance benefits after voluntarily leaving his employment without just cause three weeks or less before the end of his fixed-term contract. He emphasized that this factor was his “best ground” as it was the one that offered his appeal the “greatest chance for success”;
10. He contended that it was possible to have a fixed-term contract even if no specific employment end date was set at the time of hiring and that, in his case, he had been hired for the summer;
11. He argued that the Quebec Court of Appeal had held in a decision that seasonal work without any specific dates constituted a fixed-term contract (Fruits de mer Gascons Ltée c. Commission des normes du travail, Quebec Court of Appeal, March 15, 2004) (Exhibits GD6-1 to GD6-11);
12. He noted that, in that decision (Fruits de mer Gascons Ltée c. Commission des normes du travail, Quebec Court of Appeal, March 15, 2004), the Court of Appeal held that [translation] “…Seasonal work is performed in accordance with a plan understood and agreed to by all parties. It begins in the spring and ends during the summer of every year and involves a number of successive fixed-term contracts over time, from year to year and from season to season.” (Fruits de mer Gascons Ltée c. Commission des normes du travail, Quebec Court of Appeal, March 15, 2004, para. 23) (Exhibits GD6-1 to GD6-11). He noted that this decision referred to fixed-term contracts without specific employment start and end dates;
13. He stated that article 2086 of the Civil Code of Québec refers to the notion of “fixed or indeterminate contract” but that reference must be made to the case law to determine the type of contract at issue;
14. He explained that, after articling in order to qualify for the Barreau du Québec (February 2013), he registered for the master’s program in law at the University of X and that the program started in late August, just before September 2013. He said he had chosen August 23, 2013 as the date of his last work day because he was to begin his master’s studies in the days that followed. He indicated that he thought he would be studying full time and that he had registered for three courses but that he did not remember whether he had full-time student status at the time (Exhibits GD3-36 and GD3-37);
15. He explained that he began his studies to improve his profile and to make it easier to find a position as a lawyer. He noted that he had registered for a master’s program before obtaining his employment with the employer, Le Capitole de Québec inc., because, as a lawyer, he wanted to avoid being professionally inactive for too long (Exhibit GD3-38);
16. He also contended that he voluntarily left his employment because he had reasonable assurance of obtaining another employment in the immediate future by moving to X. He noted that his primary intent was to find a full-time job in either X or X. He said he began working as a lawyer in late October 2013 and simultaneously continued his master’s program (exhibits GD2-2 and GD3-36 to GD3-38);
17. In the alternative, he argued that he had left his employment to put himself in a better position to find permanent employment in his profession (Exhibit GD2-2);
18. He contended that that he had been available for full-time work at all times since February 2013 and noted that he continued looking for employment as a lawyer from February to October 2013, even when working full time for the employer and when he was studying (Exhibits GD3-36 and GD3-37).

[17] The Commission presented the following arguments and submissions:

1. Subsection 30(2) of the Act provides for disqualification where the claimant voluntarily leaves his or her employment without just cause. The applicable test, having regard to all the circumstances, is whether the claimant had a reasonable alternative to leaving his employment when he did (Exhibit GD4-2);
2. The Commission explained that, despite the Appellant’s claims, it found that the latter had left voluntarily because he himself chose the end date of his employment. It emphasized that, when the Appellant accepted his employment, it was he who notified the employer that he would be moving at the end of the summer. The Commission contended that, since no employment end date had been determined, it considered that the Appellant could have continued working if he had not chosen to go back to school in another city. The Commission determined that it was therefore the Appellant who took the initiative of terminating his employment, notwithstanding the fact the employer was notified of the situation from the start or during the term of the contract (Exhibit GD4-2);
3. The Commission contended that the Appellant did not have just cause for leaving his employment on August 23, 2013 because he did not exhaust all reasonable alternatives before leaving that employment. It argued that, considering all the evidence, a reasonable alternative would have been for the Appellant not to make the personal choice to move or to ensure he had a job elsewhere before leaving the employment he held. The Commission noted that it was the Appellant who chose to change cities so that he could study and that this was a personal decision for which EI contributors as a whole were not required to take responsibility. It stated that, although the Appellant indicated in his letter of appeal to the Tribunal that he had the assurance of another employment in the immediate future by moving, that information was incorrect. It emphasized that the Appellant informed it that he had been looking for full-time employment in his field since February 2013, that he had left his employment in X to resume his studies in September 2013 and to continue looking for a position as a lawyer and that, in late October 2013, he had found the position that he still occupies to this day (Exhibit GD3-37). The Commission noted that it did not agree that, when the Appellant left X on August 23, 2013, he had reasonable assurance of another employment in the immediate future since he found that employment in late October 2013, two months after his voluntary leaving. It concluded that the Appellant did not prove he had just cause for leaving his employment within the meaning of the Act (Exhibit GD4-3).

Analysis

[18] In Rena-Astronomo (A-141-97), which confirmed the principle established in Tanguay (A-1458-84) that the onus is on the claimant who voluntarily left an employment to prove that there was no other reasonable alternative for leaving the employment at that time, MacDonald J.A. of the Federal Court of Appeal (the Court) stated: "The test to be applied having regard to all the circumstances is whether, on the balance of probabilities, the claimant had no reasonable alternative to leaving his or her employment."

[19] This principle was confirmed in other decisions of the Court (Peace, 2004 FCA 56; Landry, A-1210-92).

[20] Moreover, the term "just cause", as it is used in subsections 29(c) and 30(1) of the Act, was interpreted by the Court in Tanguay v. C.E.I.C. (A-1458-84 (October 2, 1985); 68 N.R. 154) as follows:

In the context in which they are used these words are not synonymous with "reasons" or "motive". An employee who has won a lottery or inherited a fortune may have an excellent reason for leaving his employment: he does not thereby have just cause within the meaning of s. 41(1). This subsection is an important provision in an Act which creates a system of insurance against unemployment, and its language must be interpreted in accordance with the duty that ordinarily applies to any insured, not to deliberately cause the risk to occur. To be more precise, I would say that an employee who has voluntarily left his employment and has not found another has deliberately placed himself in a situation which enables him to compel third parties to pay him unemployment insurance benefits. He is only justified in acting this way if, at the time he left, circumstances existed which excused him for thus taking the risk of causing others to bear the burden of his unemployment.

[21] The Court also confirmed that the onus is on the claimant who voluntarily left their employment to prove that there was no reasonable alternative to leaving at that time (White, 2011 FCA 190).

[22] In Christine Beaulieu (2008 FCA 133, A-465-07), the Court stated:

One need only recall the jurisprudence of this Court applicable to this case. In Canada (Attorney General) v. Martel, [1994] F.C.J. No. 1458 (F.C.A.) (QL), A-1691-92, a case which is factually similar to the one at hand, I wrote for the Court (para. 12): An employee who voluntarily leaves his employment to take a training course which is not authorized by the Commission certainly has an excellent reason for doing so in personal terms; but we feel it is contrary to the very principles underlying the unemployment insurance system for that employee to be able to impose the economic burden of his decision on contributors to the fund. Subsequent jurisprudence has been consistent with this decision (Canada (Attorney General) v. Traynor, [1995] F.C.J. No. 836 (F.C.A.) (QL); Canada (Attorney General) v. Barnett, [1996] F.C.J. No. 1289 (F.C.A.) (QL); Canada (Attorney General) v. Bois, 2001 FCA 175, [2001] F.C.J. No. 878 (F.C.A.) (QL); Canada v. Wall, 2002 F.C.A. 283, [2002] F.C.J. No. 1024 (F.C.A.) (QL); Canada (Attorney General) v. Shaw, 2002 FCA 325; Canada (Attorney General) v. Lessard, 2002 FCA 469, [2002] F.C.J. No. 1655 (F.C.A.) (QL); Canada (Attorney General) v. Connell, 2003 FCA 144, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1147 (F.C.A.) (QL); Canada (Attorney General) v. Bédard, 2004 FCA 21, [2004] F.C.J. No. 270 (F.C.A.) (QL); Canada (Attorney General) v. Caron, 2007 FCA 204, [2007] F.C.J. No. 754 (F.C.A.) (QL)).

[23] In Gauthier (2006 FCA 40, A-552-03), the Court states:

This Court’s case law is both clear and consistent. Voluntarily leaving one’s employment to return to school, except for programs of instruction authorized by the Employment Insurance Commission, is a ground for disqualification from Employment Insurance benefits under sections 29 and 30 of the Employment Insurance Act, S.C. 1996, c. 23 (Act): see Attorney General of Canada v. Bédard, 2004 FCA 21; Canada (Attorney General) v. Laughland, 2003 FCA 129; Canada (Attorney General) v. Lessard, 2002 FCA 469.

[24] A claimant has just cause for voluntarily leaving their employment if, having regard to all the circumstances, including those set out in paragraph 29(c) of the Act, leaving was the only reasonable alternative in the claimant’s situation.

[25] In this case, the Tribunal finds, having regard to all the circumstances, that the decision the Appellant made to leave the employment he held with the employer, Le Capitole de Québec inc., cannot be considered the only reasonable alternative in this situation (White, 2011 FCA 190; Rena‑Astronomo, A‑141‑97; Tanguay, A‑1458‑84; Peace, 2004 FCA 56; Landry, A‑1210‑92, Beaulieu, 2008 FCA 133, Gauthier, 2006 FCA 40).

[26] A reasonable alternative under the Act would have been for the Appellant to continue in his employment with the employer while waiting to find another employment more consistent with his interests or training.

[27] The Tribunal finds that the Appellant had an opportunity to continue his employment with the employer but that he himself took the initiative of terminating that employment.

Training course

[28] The evidence shows that the Appellant intended to start a master’s program at the University of X and that this was essentially the reason why he voluntarily left the employment he had on August 23, 2013.

[29] The Appellant argued at the hearing that his situation should be analyzed from the standpoint of an “end of his term of…for a set term” within the meaning of paragraph 33(1)(a) of the Act. He noted that this was his “best ground” as it was the one with the “greatest chance of success” and questioned whether it was appropriate to analyze his voluntary leaving based on the decision he had made to take a training program.

[30] However, the Tribunal finds that the Appellant’s decision to go back to school is a fundamental factor to be considered in determining whether the Appellant had just cause for leaving within the meaning of the Act. It is a circumstance that cannot be excluded from the analysis.

[31] The Tribunal also notes that voluntarily leaving one’s employment to go back to school, except for programs of instruction authorized by the Employment Insurance Commission, is a ground for disqualification from Employment Insurance benefits under sections 29 and 30 of the Employment Insurance Act (Beaulieu, 2008 FCA 133, Gauthier, 2006 FCA 40).

[32] Nothing in this case suggests that this was a course or program to which “the Commission, or an authority that the Commission designate[d]…referred” the Appellant under section 25 of the Act. It was not a training course recommended or directed by Emploi-Québec, the designated competent authority in this matter.

[33] In this situation, the Appellant did not have just cause for voluntarily leaving within the meaning of the Act (Beaulieu, 2008 FCA 133, Gauthier, 2006 FCA 40).

[34] Although the Appellant decided to leave his employment for an excellent reason, that reason did not constitute just cause within the meaning of the Act (Beaulieu, 2008 FCA 133, Gauthier, 2006 FCA 40).

Reasonable assurance of another employment

[35] The Appellant did not show that, before his voluntary leaving, he had obtained “reasonable assurance of another employment in the immediate future,” as provided in subparagraph 29(c)(vi) of the Act.

[36] In his notice of appeal, the Appellant contended that he voluntarily left his employment because he had obtained reasonable assurance of another employment in the immediate future by moving to X (Exhibit GD2-2). He also noted that his primary intention was to find a full-time job in either X or X, that he had remained available for work and that he had looked for employment in his field during the period in which he worked for the employer.

[37] The evidence shows that the Appellant obtained a position as a lawyer in late October 2013, some two months after voluntarily leaving the employment he had with the employer.

Expiration of term and section 33 of the Act

[38] The Appellant contended that he had a fixed term contract with his employer and that he voluntarily left his employment on August 23, 2013, less than three weeks before the scheduled end date of his employment on September 2, 2013. He noted that this date corresponded to the end of the summer period and that he had agreed with his employer when he was hired that he would only work during that period. He argued that the provisions of section 33 of the Act applied to his case.

[39] The Tribunal finds that the Appellant’s work with the employer was not performed under an employment contract with a “set term” pursuant to paragraph 33(1)(a) of the Act.

[40] Section 33 of the Act specifically provides as follows:

(1) A claimant is not entitled to receive benefits if the claimant loses an employment because of their misconduct or voluntarily leaves without just cause within three weeks before (a) the expiration of a term of employment, in the case of employment for a set term; or (b) the day on which the claimant is to be laid off according to a notice already given by the employer to the claimant. (2) The disentitlement lasts until the expiration of the term of employment or the day on which the claimant was to be laid off.

[41] Notwithstanding the reasons cited by the Appellant, he may not invoke the exception provided for in section 33 of the Act limiting his disentitlement to receive benefits to the three-week period that preceded the “expiration of [his] term of employment…for a set term” within the meaning of paragraph 33(1)(a) of the Act.

[42] The Appellant did not show that he had a term of employment for a set term with his employer or that the “expiration of his term” could be determined to be September 2, 2013.

[43] In the circumstances, the Appellant’s voluntary leaving on August 23, 2013 may not be said to have fallen within the three-week period preceding the “expiration of his term of employment”, which the Appellant himself claimed occurred on September 2, 2013.

[44] The Tribunal finds that the versions of the Appellant and the employer contradict each other with respect to the existence of a fixed term of employment scheduled to terminate on September 2, 2013.

[45] It appears from the evidence presented that the Appellant himself chose the date, August 23, 2013, on which he would leave his employment to begin studying in X. The evidence also shows it was the Appellant who informed the employer of the situation and the fact he would be moving at the end of the summer to go back to school.

[46] The Appellant contended that he had agreed with his employer at the time he was hired that he would only be working for the summer, that the latter knew he would be going back to school in September 2013 and that he might leave his employment at any time if he found an employment related to the field in which he had trained.

[47] The Appellant also stated that he had not discussed a specific employment end date at the time he was hired as everyone knew he would be leaving his employment at the end of August 2013 (Exhibit GD3-38).

[48] The employer, for his part, clearly stated that there was no scheduled date for the expiration of the Appellant’s employment, even though the Appellant had been hired for the summer and that everything depended on the workload of the establishment where the Appellant worked. The employer noted that the Appellant might have been able to continue working on a part-time basis as needed (Exhibit GD3-39).

[49] At the hearing, the Appellant noted on this point that the employer’s statements had been made by a person whom he did not know and had not met when he was hired and that those statements were immaterial. The Tribunal is of the view that, even though the Appellant said he did not know the employer’s representative, there is every indication that the statements she made to the Commission reflect the position of the employer in this case.

[50] The Tribunal gives more credence to the employer’s explanation that no specific date was planned for the end of the Appellant’s employment and that the Appellant could have continued working.

[51] The Tribunal is of the view that, in arguing at the hearing that he had a “fixed-term contract” with an expiration date of September 2, 2013, the Appellant attempted instead to paint a rosier picture of his situation to justify his voluntary leaving.

[52] The Tribunal notes that the Appellant’s explanations clearly showed that he left voluntarily because he had decided to go back to school and had moved to X for that purpose or because he had obtained reasonable assurance of another employment in the immediate future.

[53] The Appellant himself stated that the employer made no mention of a specific expiration date when he was hired (as Exhibit GD3-38).

[54] The Appellant presented no tangible evidence to show that he had a “fixed-term contract” with the employer or the date on which that contract expired.

[55] The Appellant’s reference to the Quebec Court of Appeal’s decision in Fruits de mer Gascons Ltée c. Commission des normes du travail, Quebec Court of Appeal, March 15, 2004, does not support his statement that he had a “fixed-term contract”. That document merely states that fixed-term contracts exist for workers, without defining that type of contract. Similarly, article 2086 of the Civil Code of Québec, to which the Appellant also referred, merely states, “A contract of employment is for a fixed term or for an indefinite term.”

[56] The disentitlement to receive benefits cannot be limited to the period preceding the scheduled expiration of the Appellant’s employment contract on September 2, 2013 as it was not shown that such a contract existed.

[57] The exception provided for in section 33 of the Act is not applicable to this case.

[58] The disqualification of the Appellant from receiving benefits is based on subsection 30(1) of the Act, which provides as follows:

(1) A claimant is disqualified from receiving any benefits if the claimant lost any employment because of their misconduct or voluntarily left any employment without just cause, unless (a) the claimant has, since losing or leaving the employment, been employed in insurable employment for the number of hours required by section 7 or 7.1 to qualify to receive benefits; or (b) the claimant is disentitled under sections 31 to 33 in relation to the employment.

[59] Having regard to the case law cited above, the Tribunal finds that the Appellant did not show there was no reasonable alternative to leaving his employment at Le Capitole de Québec inc. The Appellant could have continued to work for this employer or ensured he obtained other employment before voluntarily leaving (Rena-Astronomo, A-141-97; Tanguay, A 1458-84; Landry, A-1210-92; Peace, 2004 FCA 56; White, 2011 FCA 190; Beaulieu, 2008 FCA 133; Gauthier, 2006 FCA 40).

[60] In light of all the circumstances, the Tribunal finds that the Appellant did not have just cause for voluntarily leaving his employment under sections 29 and 30 of the Act.

[61] There is no merit to the appeal on this issue.

Conclusion

[62] The appeal is dismissed.