Employment Insurance (EI)

Reasons and decision

Persons in attendance

[1] The Appellant, L. L., was present at the telephone hearing (teleconference) held on October 25, 2016. He was represented by Me Dominic Martineau of Martineau Hébert avocats s.e.n.c.

Introduction

[2] On September 22, 2014, the Appellant made an initial claim for benefits (sickness benefits) that took effect on September 14, 2014 (Exhibit GD4-1). He stated that he had worked for the employer Art-Dem démolition inc. from November 21, 2012, to September 19, 2014, inclusive, and had stopped working for that employer because of a leave for illness, injury or surgery (Exhibits GD3-3 to GD3-11 and GD4-1).

[3] On February 10, 2016, the Respondent, the Employment Insurance Commission of Canada (the “Commission”) notified the Appellant that it could not renew his claim for benefits starting on September 14, 2014, to receive regular benefits, because his last renewable week was the week of September 6, 2015. The Commission advised the Appellant that it could not establish a new claim because he had not worked again since September 14, 2014, to accumulate the necessary insurable hours (Exhibits GD3-18 and GD3-21).

[4] On February 23, 2016, the Appellant filed a request for reconsideration of an employment insurance decision (Exhibits GD3-22 to GD3-24).

[5] On March 29, 2016, the Commission informed the Appellant that it was upholding the decision made in his case, dated February 10, 2016, regarding the length of his benefit period (Exhibits GD3-27 and GD3-28).

[6] On April 13, 2016, the Appellant filed a notice of appeal with the Employment Insurance Section of the General Division of the Social Security Tribunal of Canada (the “Tribunal”) (Exhibits GD2-1 to GD2-6).

[7] On June 24, 2016, the Tribunal sent a notice of intent to summarily dismiss the appeal to the Appellant and asked him to provide new written submissions by July 25, 2016, to explain why his appeal could have a reasonable chance of success (Exhibits GD5-1 to GD5-7).

[8] On July 26, 2016, the Appellant’s representative sent some information to the Tribunal in order to show that the Appellant was entitled to receive benefits for a longer period than that determined by the Commission (Exhibit GD6-1).

[9] On August 17, 2016, in response to a request from the Tribunal to that effect on August 15, 2016, under section 32 of the Social Security Tribunal Regulations, the Commission sent additional arguments in order to establish that the Appellant was not entitled to an extension of his benefit period under subsection 10(10) of the Act (Exhibits GD7-1 to GD7-3, GD8-1 and GD8-2).

[10] On August 17, 2016, the Tribunal informed the Appellant and his representative that the appeal would not be summarily dismissed (Exhibits GD9-1 and GD9-2).

[11] This appeal was heard by teleconference for the following reasons:

1. The fact that the Appellant would be the only party in attendance at the hearing;
2. The information on file, including the need for additional information;
3. The fact that the Appellant or other parties were represented;
4. This type of hearing is in compliance with the requirement in the Social Security Tribunal Regulations that proceedings be conducted as informally and quickly as the circumstances and the considerations of fairness and natural justice permit (Exhibits GD1-1 to GD1-4).

Issue

[12] The Tribunal must determine whether the maximum number of weeks during which employment insurance benefits could be paid to the Appellant during his benefit period was correctly determined by the Commission, under subsections 10(2), 10(10), 12(1), 12(2) and 12(3) of the Employment Insurance Act (the “Act”).

Evidence

[13] The evidence in the files is as follows:

1. A record of employment dated September 23, 2014 (serial number: W35257724) indicates that the Appellant worked as a “labourer” for the employer Art-Dem from August 5, 2013, to September 12, 2014, inclusive and that he stopped working for that employer because of illness or injury (code D – illness or injury). The record indicates that the Appellant accumulated 938 hours of insurable employment during the period indicated (Exhibit GD3-12);
2. A record of employment dated July 22, 2013 (serial number: W28823469) indicates that the Appellant worked as a “labourer” for the employer Art-Dem from November 21, 2012, to July 19, 2013, inclusive and that he stopped working for that employer because of a shortage of work(code A – Shortage of work / End of Contract or Season). The record indicates that the Appellant accumulated 1,106 hours of insurable employment during the period indicated (Exhibit GD3-13);
3. A document entitled “Unemployment rates by Employment Insurance (EI) economic region, seasonally adjusted (3 month moving average)” indicates that, in the region designated by code number 13 (South Central Quebec), the unemployment rate during the period from September 7, 2014, to October 11, 2014, i.e. the period during which the Appellant filed his claim for employment insurance benefits, was 5.6% (Exhibits GD3-14 and GD3-15);
4. On February 4, 2016, the Appellant sent a medical certificate from the X family medicine group to the Commission. The certificate, dated January 12, 2016, indicated that he was fit to return to work as of January 12, 2016 (Exhibit GD3-19);
5. An amended or replaced record of employment (Serial Number of ROE amended or replaced: W35257724 – Exhibit GD3-12), dated February 5, 2016, indicates that the Appellant worked as a “labourer” for the employer Art-Dem from August 5, 2013, to September 12, 2014, inclusive, and that he stopped working for that employer because of a shortage of work (code A – Shortage of work/ End of Contract or Season). The record indicates that the Appellant accumulated 938 hours of insurable employment during the period indicated (Exhibit GD3-20);
6. On February 10, 2016, the Commission notified the Appellant that his last renewable week was the week of September 6, 2015, and that his benefit period could not be extended (Exhibits GD3-17 and GD3-18).

[14] The evidence presented at the hearing is as follows:

1. The Appellant recalled the main elements in the file in order to demonstrate his entitlement to receive benefits for a period longer than that established by the Commission ;
2. He stated that he had been unable to work for medical reasons from September 21, 2014, to January 11, 2016, inclusive (Exhibits GD3-16 and GD3-17). He indicated that he had obtained a doctor’s recommendation stating that he was fit to return to work as of January 12, 2016 (Exhibit GD3-19);
3. The Appellant indicated that he had started a new job with the employer Échafaudage F. at the end of March 2016 (Exhibits GD3-25 and GD3-26).

Parties’ arguments

[15] The Appellant and his representative, Me Dominic Martineau, made the following submissions and arguments:

1. The Appellant explained that he had not been able to work, for medical reasons, during the period from September 21, 2014, to January 11, 2016, inclusive. He indicated that he would have been fit to return to work as of September 2015 but that he did not have a doctor’s certificate establishing this, as his doctor had taken a long time to perform the examinations required for him to be able to return to work (Exhibits GD3-25 and GD3-26);
2. He noted that the medical diagnosis he had obtained before the start of his disability period on September 21, 2014, indicates that he suffered from acute low back pain and that his condition was work related. The Appellant noted that he had had to wait a long time for his diagnosis because he did not have a family doctor:
3. The Appellant explained that he had initially applied for compensation to the Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail(CSST) (now the Commission des normes, de l’équité, de la santé et de la sécurité du travail, or CNESST) but that his application was denied because he had not been injured at the workplace and that his health problem was not recognized as an occupational illness (Exhibit GD3-17). He stated that he had had to start by applying for compensation from the CNESST before making a claim for benefits with the Commission de la construction du Québec(CCQ). The Appellant noted that he had received wage loss benefits from the CCQ (period from September 21, 2014, to September 21, 2015) (Exhibits GD3-16 and GD3-17);
4. He stated that he had received employment insurance sickness benefits (special benefits) for a 15-week period (Exhibits GD3-16 and GD3-17);
5. The Appellant asserted that he found it unfair that he would have to work the number of hours of insurable employment required to be entitled to receive benefits again after his benefit period ended in September 2015. He noted that he had accumulated a large number of hours when he applied for sickness benefits in September 2014 and that he had lost all of those hours. The Appellant asserted that the Act was flawed. He argued that he had paid employment insurance contributions and that when he needed benefits he was not entitled to them. The Appellant stated that he had had to sell some of his assets in order to get by financially (Exhibits GD3-25 and GD3-26);
6. He argued that a benefit period could be extended to 104 weeks given that he had been sick (Exhibits GD3-25 and GD3-26);
7. The Appellant asserted that the decision rendered in his case was erroneous in fact and in law (Exhibit GD2-2);
8. The representative explained that, with regard to occupational health and safety, when a claim for compensation is filed with the CNESST to have an illness recognized as an occupational illness, the medical diagnosis of the illness in question must be in line with what appears in Schedule I to the Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases (Quebec) in order to be recognized as an occupational illness. He indicated that the medical diagnosis establishing that the Appellant’s illness, i.e. work-related acute low back pain or mechanical low back pain, was not accepted because it does not appear on the list of occupational diseases in Schedule I to the Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases;
9. The representative noted that, in order for an illness to be recognized as an occupational illness, the medical assessment that is submitted must establish a connection between the medical diagnosis and the work that a person has been doing over the years. He stated that the Appellant’s illness was not officially recognized as an occupational disease by the CNESST. The representative indicated that this situation explained why the CNESST had turned down the Appellant’s compensation claim and refused to pay him compensation. He asserted that the Appellant was nevertheless disabled because of the work he had been doing in recent years;
10. He indicated that reconsideration of the CNESST’s decision in the Appellant’s case had been requested on February 17, 2016, but that the CNESST had not yet rendered a decision;
11. The representative noted that the Appellant had received 15 weeks of employment insurance sickness benefits (special benefits). He also indicated that the Appellant had received wage loss benefits from the CCQ for a period of one year, from September 21, 2014, to September 21, 2015. The representative explained that the Appellant had not accumulated enough hours of work to be able to receive such benefits for a period of two years. He noted that the Appellant had not received any income as of September 21, 2015;
12. He argued that, had it not been for the Appellant’s period of disability from September 2014 to January 2016, he would have been able to work and to accumulate a sufficient number of hours to requalify to receive employment insurance benefits (Exhibit GD6-1).

[16] The Commission made the following submissions and arguments:

1. It explained that, under subsection 10(2) of the Act, the length of a benefit period is 52 weeks. It noted that it is during that period that claimants can receive the maximum number of benefits to which they are entitled. The Commission noted that the Appellant’s entitlement ended once the 52 weeks had elapsed even though he did not receive the maximum number of weeks payable (Exhibit GD4-3);
2. The Commission indicated that subsection 12(2) of the Act sets out the maximum number of weeks for which benefits may be paid in a benefit period, in accordance with the number of insurable hours accumulated during the qualifying period and the applicable regional rate of unemployment (Exhibit GD4-2);
3. It determined that the Appellant had accumulated 1,271 hours of insurable employment in his qualifying period, i.e. from May 5, 2013, to September 13, 2014. The Commission noted that the regional rate of unemployment was 5.6% at the time when his benefit period was established. It therefore determined that the number of weeks during which regular employment insurance benefits could be paid to the Appellant under Schedule I of subsection 12(2) of the Act was 22 weeks (Exhibits GD3-12 to GD3-15, GD4-1 and GD4-3);
4. The Commission indicated that the Appellant had received 15 weeks of sickness benefits (special benefits) from September 28, 2014, to January 10, 2015 (Exhibits GD4-1 and GD8- 1);
5. It noted that the Appellant did not receive the 22 weeks of regular benefits to which he was entitled given that, because of his health, he was unable to work throughout the entire benefit period, i.e. from September 14, 2014, to September 6 (Exhibits GD3-17 to GD3-19 and GD8-1);
6. The Commission noted that the Appellant expressed his disagreement with the fact that he was not able to receive regular employment insurance benefits after September 6, 2015 (Exhibit GD4-3);
7. It explained that an extension of a benefit period can be granted under subsection 10(10) of the Act (Exhibit GD4-3);
8. The Commission noted that the Appellant had established a benefit period as of September 14, 2014, and that the end of his benefit period was therefore the week that started on September 6, 2015, i.e. a period of 52 weeks (Exhibit GD4-3);
9. It determined that the Appellant was not entitled to an extension of his benefit period since he did not meet any criteria under which he would be entitled to an extension (Exhibits GD4-3, GD4-4 and GD8-1);
10. The Commission stated that the Appellant could not receive an extension of the benefit period under subsection 10(10) of the Act since he had not established that he was not entitled to benefits for one of the four stated reasons, namely that he was a) confined in a jail, penitentiary or other similar institution and was not found guilty of the offence for which the claimant was being held or any other offence arising out of the same transaction; b) in receipt of earnings paid because of the complete severance of their relationship with their former employer; c) in receipt of workers’ compensation payments for an illness or injury; or in receipt of payments under a provincial law on the basis of having ceased to work because continuing to work would have resulted in danger to the claimant, her unborn child or a child whom she was breast-feeding (Exhibits GD4-3, GD4-4 and GD8-1);
11. The Commission stated that the workers’ compensation provided in Quebec for an injury or illness is paid through the CNESST, which had declined to provide the Appellant with compensation during the period of his illness (Exhibits GD3-17 and GD8-1);
12. It determined that the Appellant had received wage loss benefits from the CCQ, which does not constitute workers’ compensation payments for an injury or illness (Exhibit GD8- 1);
13. The Commission asserted that it had established that, although the Appellant had not received the 22 weeks of regular benefits to which he was entitled for the benefit period that started on September 14, 2014, he could not be paid any benefits after the week starting on September 6, 2015 (Exhibit GD4-3).

Analysis

[17] The relevant legislative provisions appear in an appendix to this decision.

[18] With regard to the application of subsection 12(2) of the Act, the Tribunal notes that legislative amendments have been made to that subsection and that those amendments came into force on July 3, 2016. Since the Appellant’s claim for benefits came into effect on September 14, 2014 (Exhibits GD3-3 to GD3-11 and GD4-1), the applicable legislative provisions from subsection 12(2) of the Act are those in effect before the amendments thereto came into force on July 3, 2016. Those amendments apply only to the benefit periods established as of July 3, 2016.

[19] The legislative provisions of subsection 12(2) of the Act, which pre-dated July 3, 2016, are as follows:

(2) … the maximum number of weeks for which benefits may be paid in a benefit period because of a reason other than those mentioned in subsection (3) shall be determined in accordance with the table in Schedule I by reference to the regional rate of unemployment that applies to the claimant and the number of hours of insurable employment of the claimant in their qualifying period.

[20] The amendments that came into force on July 3, 2016, essentially stipulated that the provisions of subsection 12(2) applied “[s]ubject to subsections (2.1) to (2.6)”.

[21] In Knee (2011 FCA 301), the Federal Court of Appeal (the “Court”) held as follows: “However, tempting as it may be in such cases (and this may well be one), adjudicators are permitted neither to re-write legislation nor to interpret it in a manner that is contrary to its plain meaning.”

[22] In CUB 67513, the Umpire noted as follows:

There is a consistent line of authority to the effect that wage-loss benefits do not constitute workers’ compensation for illness or injury within the meaning of section 10(10)(c) of the Act (CUBs 14652, 57593 and 56235). It is also well established case law that during a period in which a claimant is receiving wage-loss benefits, he or she does not accumulate hours of insurable employment (CUBs 11114, 10448 and 23814). In CUB 10448, Reed J. wrote: Unfortunately, the claimant was not accumulating weeks of insurable employment when he was on workmen’s compensation. Premiums are not paid in respect of such compensation. There are no earnings flowing from the employment relationship as contemplated under section 3(1) (now section 5(1)) of the Act.

[23] In this case, the Commission initially determined that the Appellant’s employment insurance benefit period came into effect on September 14, 2014 (Exhibits GD3-3 to GD3-11 and GD4-1).

[24] The Appellant’s qualifying period was established from May 5, 2013, to September 13, 2014 (Exhibits GD3-12 to GD3-13 and GD4-1).

[25] The Commission stated that, under subsection 10(2) of the Act, the length of a benefit period is 52 weeks and that, in the Appellant’s case, his benefit period ended with the week that started on September 6, 2015 (Exhibit GD4-3).

[26] It indicated that the Appellant lives in the South Central Quebec economic region, where the unemployment rate at the time when he filed his claim for benefits was 5.6% (Exhibits GD3‑14, GD3-15 and GD4-1).

[27] The Commission also explained that the Appellant was entitled to receive regular employment insurance benefits for a maximum period of 22 weeks, in accordance with subsection 12(2) of the Act and Schedule I (Table of Weeks of Benefits) of that subsection (Exhibit GD4-1).

[28] The following table indicates the number of benefit weeks to which claimants are entitled in accordance with the number of hours of insurable employment they have worked and the regional unemployment rate that applies in their case.

Schedule I (subsection 12(2))
Table of weeks of benefits

[29] The Tribunal notes that the number of hours (1,271) of insurable employment the Appellant accumulated during his qualifying period falls within the “1,260–1,294” category in the Schedule I “Table of Weeks of Benefits” and under the “6% and under” column in that table for “Regional Rate of Unemployment”. The combination of those two elements therefore shows that the maximum number of weeks during which the Appellant can be paid employment insurance benefits is in fact 22 weeks.

[30] The Commission explained that the Appellant had not received regular benefits during that 22-week period because he was unable to work for health reasons throughout the entire benefit period, i.e. from September 14, 2014, to September 6, 2015 (Exhibits GD3-17 to GD3‑19 and Exhibit GD8-1).

[31] It noted that the Appellant had received sickness benefits (special benefits) for a period of 15 weeks, i.e. from September 28, 2014, to January 10, 2015 (Exhibits GD4- 1 and GD8-1).

Extension of benefit period

[32] The Appellant argued that, in light of his situation, his benefit period could be extended to 104 weeks.

[33] With regard to that point, the Commission explained that an extension of the benefit period could be granted under subsection 10(10) of the Act (Exhibits GD4-3, GD4-4 and GD8‑1).

[34] Subsection 10(10) of the Act provides as follows:

(10) A claimant’s benefit period is extended by the aggregate of any weeks during the benefit period for which the claimant proves, in such manner as the Commission may direct, that the claimant was not entitled to benefits because the claimant was (a) confined in a jail, penitentiary or other similar institution and was not found guilty of the offence for which the claimant was being held or any other offence arising out of the same transaction; (b) in receipt of earnings paid because of the complete severance of their relationship with their former employer; (c) in receipt of workers’ compensation payments for an illness or injury; or (d) in receipt of payments under a provincial law on the basis of having ceased to work because continuing to work would have resulted in danger to the claimant, her unborn child or a child whom she was breast-feeding.

[35] At the hearing, the Appellant indicated that the application for benefits that he had submitted to the CNESST was not based on an injury suffered at work, but rather the health problems he was experiencing (acute low back pain), which constituted an occupational illness.

[36] The representative explained that the Appellant’s illness was not recognized as an occupational disease by the CNESST because it is not listed in Schedule I to the Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases. The representative noted that, for that reason, the Appellant’s application for CNESST benefits had been turned down.

[37] The Tribunal notes that the Appellant has not established that his illness is an occupational illness given that he was unable to obtain compensation from the CNESST.

[38] The Tribunal finds that the Appellant has not established that the wage loss benefits he received from the CCQ represent “workers’ compensation payments for an illness or injury” under paragraph 10(10)(c) of the Act.

[39] The Commission stated that the workers’ compensation provided in Quebec for an injury or illness is paid through the CNESST, which had declined to provide the Appellant with compensation during the period of his illness (Exhibits GD3-17 and GD8- 1).

[40] It determined that the Appellant had received wage loss benefits from the CCQ but that those benefits did not represent workers’ compensation payments for an illness or injury (Exhibit GD8-1).

[41] The Commission asserted that it had established the fact that, although the Appellant had not received the 22 weeks of regular benefits to which he was entitled for the benefit period that started on September 14, 2014, he could not be paid any benefits after the week starting on September 6, 2015 (Exhibit GD4-3).

[42] The Tribunal is of the opinion that the Appellant’s situation does not correspond to any of the situations referred to in subsection 10(10) of the Act that could have extended the number of benefit weeks.

[43] The Tribunal notes that it is bound by very clear legislative provisions that it is unable to override (Knee, 2011 FCA 301).

[44] The Appellant has not presented any new grounds or facts that could have led the Tribunal to find that the maximum number of weeks to which he was entitled could be different from the number established by the Commission, i.e. 22 weeks.

[45] However, the Appellant's specific situation meant that he did not receive regular benefits throughout the 22-week period to which he was entitled during his benefit period, because he was unable to work for medical reasons from September 21, 2014, to January 11, 2016, inclusive.

[46] The Appellant in fact received sickness benefits for a 15-week period, from September 28, 2014, to January 10, 2015 (Exhibits GD4-1 and GD8-1). This is the maximum number of weeks for which special benefits can be paid under paragraph 12(3)(c) of the Act.

[47] The Tribunal finds that the maximum number of weeks for which employment insurance benefits could be paid to the Appellant during his benefit period was correctly determined by the Commission under subsections 10(2), 10(10), 12(1), 12(2) and 12(3) of the Act.

[48] The appeal in respect of this issue is without merit.

Conclusion

[49] The appeal is dismissed.

Appendix

The law

Employment Insurance Act

10 (1) A benefit period begins on the later of

1. (a) the Sunday of the week in which the interruption of earnings occurs, and;
2. (b) the Sunday of the week in which the initial claim for benefits is made.

(2) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (10) to (15) and section 24, the length of a benefit period is 52 week.

(3) Subject to a change or cancellation of a benefit period under this section, a benefit period shall not be established for the claimant if a prior benefit period has not ended.

(4) An initial claim for benefits made after the day when the claimant was first qualified to make the claim shall be regarded as having been made on an earlier day if the claimant shows that the claimant qualified to receive benefits on the earlier day and that there was good cause for the delay throughout the period beginning on the earlier day and ending on the day when the initial claim was made.

(5) A claim for benefits, other than an initial claim for benefits, made after the time prescribed for making the claim shall be regarded as having been made on an earlier day if the claimant shows that there was good cause for the delay throughout the period beginning on the earlier day and ending on the day when the claim was made.

(5.1) A claim for benefits referred to in section 23.1 with respect to a family member shall not be regarded as having been made on an earlier day under subsection (4) or (5) if

1. (a) at the time the claim is made, all benefits that may otherwise have been payable in relation to that claim have already been exhausted;
2. (b) the beginning of the period referred to in subsection 23.1(4) has already been determined with respect to that family member and the claim would have the effect of moving the beginning of that period to an earlier date; or
3. (c) the claim is made in any other circumstances set out in the regulations.

(5.2) A claim for benefits referred to in section 23.2 with respect to a critically ill child or children who are critically ill as a result of the same event must not be regarded as having been made on an earlier day under subsection (4) or (5) if

1. (a) at the time the claim is made, all benefits that may otherwise have been payable in relation to that claim have already been exhausted;
2. (b) the beginning of the period referred to in subsection 23.2(3) or (4) has already been determined with respect to that child or those children and the claim would have the effect of moving the beginning of that period to an earlier date; or
3. (c) the claim is made in any other circumstances set out in the regulations.

Once a benefit period has been established for a claimant, the Commission may

1. (a) cancel the benefit period if it has ended and no benefits were paid or payable during the period; or
2. (b) whether or not the period has ended, cancel at the request of the claimant that portion of the benefit period immediately before the first week for which benefits were paid or payable, if the claimant
   1. (i) establishes under this Part, as an insured person, a new benefit period beginning the first week for which benefits were paid or payable or establishes, under Part VII.1, as a self-employed person within the meaning of subsection 152.01(1), a new benefit period beginning the first week for which benefits were paid or payable, and
   2. (ii) shows that there was good cause for the delay in making the request throughout the period beginning on the day when benefits were first paid or payable and ending on the day when the request for cancellation was made.

(7) A cancelled benefit period or portion of a benefit period is deemed never to have begun.

(8) A benefit period ends when any of the following first occurs:

1. (a) no further benefits are payable to the claimant in their benefit period, including for the reason that benefits have been paid for the maximum number of weeks for which benefits may be paid under section 12;
2. (b) the benefit period would otherwise end under this section; or
3. (c) [Repealed, 2002, c. 9, s. 12]
4. (d) the claimant
   1. (i) requests that their benefit period end,
   2. (ii) makes a new initial claim for benefits under this Part or Part VII.1, and
   3. (iii) qualifies, as an insured person, to receive benefits under this Part or qualifies, as a self-employed person within the meaning of subsection 152.01(1), to receive benefits under Part VII.1.

(9) Whether or not the benefit period has ended, a request under paragraph 8(d) shall be regarded as having been made on an earlier day if the claimant shows that there was good cause for the delay throughout the period beginning on the earlier day and ending on the day when the request was made.

(10) A claimant’s benefit period is extended by the aggregate of any weeks during the benefit period for which the claimant proves, in such manner as the Commission may direct, that the claimant was not entitled to benefits because the claimant was

1. (a) confined in a jail, penitentiary or other similar institution and was not found guilty of the offence for which the claimant was being held or any other offence arising out of the same transaction;
2. (b) in receipt of earnings paid because of the complete severance of their relationship with their former employer;
3. (c) in receipt of workers’ compensation payments for an illness or injury; or
4. (d) in receipt of payments under a provincial law on the basis of having ceased to work because continuing to work would have resulted in danger to the claimant, her unborn child or a child whom she was breast-feeding.

(11) If the child or children referred to in subsection 23(1) are hospitalized during the period referred to in subsection 23(2), the benefit period is extended by the number of weeks during which the child or children are hospitalized.

(12) If the child or children referred to in subsection 23(1) are hospitalized during the period referred to in subsection 23(2), the benefit period is extended by the number of weeks during which the child or children are hospitalized.

(12.1) If, during the period referred to in subsection 23(2), the start date of a claimant’s period of parental leave is deferred or a claimant is directed to return to duty from parental leave, in accordance with regulations made under the National Defence Act, the benefit period is extended by the number of weeks during which the claimant’s parental leave is deferred or the claimant is directed to return to duty, as the case may be.

(13) If, during a claimant’s benefit period,

1. (a) regular benefits were not paid to the claimant,
2. (b) benefits were paid to the claimant for more than one of the reasons mentioned in paragraphs 12(3)(a) to (e) and at least one of those benefits was paid for fewer than the applicable maximum number of weeks established for those reasons, and
3. (c) the maximum total number of weeks established for those reasons is greater than 50, the benefit period is extended so that those benefits may be paid up to that maximum total number of weeks.

(13.1) A claimant’s benefit period that has not ended before July 3, 2016, or that begins on or after that date, is extended by 17 weeks if the number of weeks for which benefits may be paid to the claimant has been increased as a result of subsection 12(2.1).

(13.2) Subject to subsections (13.7) and (14.1), if a claimant’s benefit period ended before July 3, 2016, that benefit period is deemed, despite subsection (8), not to have ended and it is extended by 17 weeks beginning on July 3, 2016 if the number of weeks for which benefits may be paid to the claimant has been increased as a result of subsection 12(2.1).

(13.3) A claimant’s benefit period that has not ended before July 3, 2016, or that begins on or after that date, is extended by 37 weeks if the number of weeks for which benefits may be paid to the claimant has been increased as a result of subsection 12(2.3).

(13.4) Subject to subsections (13.7) and (14.1), if a claimant’s benefit period ended before July 3, 2016, that benefit period is deemed, despite subsection (8), not to have ended and it is extended by 37 weeks beginning on July 3, 2016 if the number of weeks for which benefits may be paid to the claimant has been increased as a result of subsection 12(2.3).

(13.5) A claimant’s benefit period is extended by 29 weeks if the number of weeks for which benefits may be paid to the claimant has been increased as a result of subsection 12(2.5).

(13.6) A claimant’s benefit period is extended by 22 weeks if the number of weeks for which benefits may be paid to the claimant has been increased as a result of subsection 12(2.6).

(13.7) A benefit period that is deemed under subsection (13.2) or (13.4) not to have ended does not include the period that begins on the day after the day on which the benefit period ended and that ends on July 2, 2016.

(14) A benefit period that is deemed under subsection (13.2) or (13.4) not to have ended does not include the period that begins on the day after the day on which the benefit period ended and that ends on July 2, 2016.

(14.1) The period that is excluded under subsection (13.7) is to be included in the calculation of the 104 weeks for the purposes of subsection (14).

(15) Unless the benefit period is also extended under any of subsections (10) to (12.1), an extension under subsection (13) must not result in a benefit period of more than the sum of two weeks and the total of the maximum number of weeks established under subsection 12(3) for each of the benefits paid to the claimant for one of the reasons mentioned in paragraphs 12(3)(a) to (e) during the claimant’s benefit period before it was extended under subsection (13).

…

12 (1) If a benefit period has been established for a claimant, benefits may be paid to the claimant for each week of unemployment that falls in the benefit period, subject to the maximums established by this section.

(2) Subject to subsections (2.1) to (2.6), the maximum number of weeks for which benefits may be paid in a benefit period because of a reason other than those mentioned in subsection (3) shall be determined in accordance with the table in Schedule I by reference to the regional rate of unemployment that applies to the claimant and the number of hours of insurable employment of the claimant in their qualifying period.

(2.1) Subject to subsection (2.7), the number of weeks of benefits set out in the table in Schedule I that applies in respect of a claimant is deemed to be the number of weeks that would otherwise apply in respect of the claimant, but for this subsection, increased by five weeks if the following conditions are met:

1. (a) the claimant is not a long-tenured worker;
2. (b) the claimant’s benefit period began during the period beginning on January 4, 2015 and ending on July 8, 2017;
3. (c) the claimant’s ordinary residence at the beginning of the benefit period was in a region referred to in subsection (2.8); and
4. (d) benefits were paid or payable to the claimant because of a reason mentioned in subsection (2) for at least one week in the benefit period.

(2.2) If subsection (2.1) applies in respect of a claimant whose benefit period is deemed under subsection 10(13.2) not to have ended,

1. (a) the claimant may, for weeks beginning on or after July 3, 2016, be paid benefits because of a reason mentioned in subsection (2) for no more than the five additional weeks referred to in subsection (2.1); and
2. (b) the claimant may not be paid those additional five weeks of benefits for any week that began before July 3, 2016.

(2.3) Subject to subsection (2.7), the number of weeks of benefits set out in the table in Schedule I that applies in respect of a claimant is deemed to be the number of weeks that would otherwise apply in respect of the claimant, but for this subsection, increased by 25 weeks if the following conditions are met:

1. (a) the claimant is a long-tenured worker;
2. (b) the claimant’s benefit period began during the period beginning on January 4, 2015 and ending on October 29, 2016;
3. (c) the claimant’s ordinary residence at the beginning of the benefit period was in a region referred to in subsection (2.8); and
4. (d) benefits were paid or payable to the claimant because of a reason mentioned in subsection (2) for at least one week in the benefit period.

(2.4) If subsection (2.3) applies in respect of a claimant whose benefit period is deemed under subsection 10(13.4) not to have ended,

1. (a) the claimant may, for weeks beginning on or after July 3, 2016, be paid benefits because of a reason mentioned in subsection (2) for no more than the 25 additional weeks referred to in subsection (2.3); and
2. (b) the claimant may not be paid those additional 25 weeks of benefits for any week that began before July 3, 2016.

(2.5) The number of weeks of benefits set out in the table in Schedule I that applies in respect of a claimant is deemed to be the number of weeks that would otherwise apply in respect of the claimant, but for this subsection, increased by 17 weeks if the following conditions are met:

1. (a) the claimant is a long-tenured worker;
2. (b) the claimant’s benefit period began during the period beginning on October 30, 2016 and ending on February 25, 2017;
3. (c) the claimant’s ordinary residence at the beginning of the benefit period was in a region referred to in subsection (2.8); and
4. (d) benefits were paid or payable to the claimant because of a reason mentioned in subsection (2) for at least one week in the benefit period.

(2.6) The number of weeks of benefits set out in the table in Schedule I that applies in respect of a claimant is deemed to be the number of weeks that would otherwise apply in respect of the claimant, but for this subsection, increased by 10 weeks if the following conditions are met:

1. (a) the claimant is a long-tenured worker;
2. (b) the claimant’s benefit period began during the period beginning on February 26, 2017 and ending on July 8, 2017;
3. (c) the claimant’s ordinary residence at the beginning of the benefit period was in a region referred to in subsection (2.8); and
4. (d) benefits were paid or payable to the claimant because of a reason mentioned in subsection (2) for at least one week in the benefit period.

(2.7) If more than one benefit period in respect of a claimant began before July 3, 2016, subsection (2.1) or (2.3), as the case may be, applies to increase the number of weeks of benefits only in the benefit period that began on the day that is closest to that day.

(2.8) The regions, for the purposes of subsections (2.1) to (2.6), are the following regions described in Schedule I to the Employment Insurance Regulations:

1. (a) the region of Northern Ontario described in subsection 2(3) of that Schedule;
2. (b) the region of Sudbury described in subsection 2(14) of that Schedule;
3. (c) the region of Northern Manitoba described in subsection 6(3) of that Schedule;
4. (c.1) the region of Southern Interior British Columbia described in subsection 7(1) of that Schedule;
5. (d) the region of Northern British Columbia described in subsection 7(5) of that Schedule;
6. (e) the region of Saskatoon described in subsection 9(2) of that Schedule;
7. (e.1) the region of Southern Saskatchewan described in subsection 9(3) of that Schedule;
8. (f) the region of Northern Saskatchewan described in subsection 9(4) of that Schedule;
9. (g) the region of Calgary described in subsection 10(1) of that Schedule;
10. (g.1) the region of Edmonton described in subsection 10(2) of that Schedule;
11. (h) the region of Southern Alberta described in subsection 10(3) of that Schedule;
12. (i) the region of Northern Alberta described in subsection 10(4) of that Schedule;
13. (j) the region of Newfoundland/Labrador described in subsection 11(2) of that Schedule;
14. (k) the region of Whitehorse described in subsection 12(1) of that Schedule; and
15. (l) the region of Nunavut described in subsection 14(2) of that Schedule.

(3) The maximum number of weeks for which benefits may be paid in a benefit period

1. (a) because of pregnancy is 15;
2. (b) because the claimant is caring for one or more new-born children of the claimant or one or more children placed with the claimant for the purpose of adoption is 35;
3. (c) because of a prescribed illness, injury or quarantine is 15;
4. (d) because the claimant is providing care or support to one or more family members described in subsection 23.1(2) is 26; and
5. (e) because the claimant is providing care or support to one or more critically ill children described in subsection 23.2(1), is 35.

(4) The maximum number of weeks for which benefits may be paid

1. (a) for a single pregnancy is 15; and
2. (b) for the care of one or more new-born or adopted children as a result of a single pregnancy or placement is 35.

(4.01) If a claim is made under this Part in respect of a child or children referred to in paragraph (4)(b) and a claim is made under section 152.05 in respect of the same child or children, the maximum number of weeks of benefits payable under this Act in respect of the child or children is 35.

(4.1) Even if more than one claim is made under this Act, at least one of which is made under section 23.1 — or even if more than one certificate is issued for the purposes of this Act, at least one of which is issued for the purposes of section 23.1 — for the same reason and in respect of the same family member, the maximum number of weeks of benefits payable under this Act in respect of that family member is 26 weeks during the period of 52 weeks that begins on the first day of the week referred to in paragraph 23.1(4)(a).

(4.2) If a shorter period is prescribed for the purposes of subsection 23.1(5), then that shorter period applies for the purposes of subsection (4.1).

(4.3) When a shorter period referred to in subsection (4.2) has expired in respect of a family member, no further benefits are payable under section 23.1 in respect of that family member until the minimum prescribed number of weeks has elapsed.

(4.4) Even if more than one claim is made under this Act, at least one of which is made under section 23.2 — or even if more than one certificate is issued for the purposes of this Act, at least one of which is issued for the purposes of section 23.2 — for the same reason and in respect of the same critically ill child, the maximum number of weeks of benefits payable under this Act in respect of that child is 35 weeks during the period of 52 weeks that begins on the first day of the week referred to in paragraph 23.2(3)(a).

(4.5) Even if more than one claim is made under this Act, at least one of which is made under section 23.2 — or even if more than one certificate is issued for the purposes of this Act, at least one of which is issued for the purposes of section 23.2 — for the same reason and in respect of the same children who are critically ill as a result of the same event, the maximum number of weeks of benefits payable under this Act in respect of those children is 35 weeks during the period of 52 weeks that begins on the first day of the week referred to in paragraph 23.2(4)(a).

(5) In a claimant’s benefit period, the claimant may combine weeks of benefits to which they are entitled because of a reason mentioned in subsection (3), but the maximum number of combined weeks is 50. If the benefit period is extended under subsection 10(13), the maximum number of combined weeks equals the maximum number of weeks in the benefit period calculated under subsection 10(15) less two weeks.

(6) In a claimant’s benefit period, the claimant may, subject to the applicable maximums, combine weeks of benefits to which the claimant is entitled because of a reason mentioned in subsections (2) and (3), but the total number of weeks of benefits shall not exceed 50 or, if the maximum number of weeks for which benefits may be paid to a claimant because of a reason mentioned in subsection (2) is greater than 45 weeks as a result of the application of any of subsections (2.1), (2.3), (2.5) and (2.6), the number that corresponds to that maximum number of weeks increased by five weeks.

(7) [Repealed, 2000, c. 14, s. 3]

(8) For the purposes of this section, the placement with a major attachment claimant, at the same or substantially the same time, of two or more children for the purpose of adoption is a single placement of a child or children for the purpose of adoption.

Employment Insurance Regulations