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Reasons and decision
Decision
[1] The appeal is dismissed.
Introduction
[2] On June 29, 2017, the General Division of the Social Security Tribunal of Canada (Tribunal) determined that the Appellant had voluntarily left his employment without just cause under sections 29 and 30 of the Employment Insurance Act (Act).
[3] The Appellant filed an application for leave to appeal to the Appeal Division on July 31, 2017. Leave to appeal was granted on September 5, 2017.
Type of hearing
[4] The Tribunal determined that the appeal would be heard via teleconference for the following reasons:
- the complexity of the issue or issues;
- the fact that the parties’ credibility would probably not be a prevailing issue;
- the information in the file, including the need for additional information;
- the requirement under the Social Security Tribunal Regulations to proceed as informally and quickly as circumstances, fairness, and natural justice permit.
[5] The Appellant attended the hearing and was represented by Richard Benoit. The Respondent was represented by Manon Richardson.
The law
[6] According to subsection 58(1) of the Department of Employment and Social Development Act (DESD Act), the only grounds of appeal are the following:
- a) the General Division failed to observe a principle of natural justice or otherwise acted beyond or refused to exercise its jurisdiction;
- b) the General Division erred in law in making its decision, whether or not the error appears on the face of the record; or
- c) the General Division based its decision on an erroneous finding of fact that it made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it.
Issue
[7] The Tribunal must decide whether the General Division erred in determining that the Appellant had voluntarily left his employment without just cause under sections 29 and 30 of the Act.
Standards of review
[8] The Federal Court of Appeal determined that the Appeal Division's mandate is conferred to it by sections 55 to 69 of the DESD Act. The Appeal Division does not exercise the review and superintending powers reserved for higher courts—Canada (Attorney General) v. Jean, 2015 FCA 242; Maunder v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 FCA 274.
[9] Therefore, unless the General Division failed to observe a principle of natural justice, erred in law, based its decision on an erroneous finding of fact that it had made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it or its decision was unreasonable, the Tribunal must dismiss the appeal.
Analysis
Position of the parties
[10] The Appellant argues that the General Division failed to observe a principle of natural justice, erred in law in making its decision and based its decision on an erroneous finding of fact that it made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it.
[11] He argues that there is an agreement between the Commission de la construction du Québec (CCQ) [Quebec's construction commission], the centre local d’emploi du Québec (CLE) [Quebec's local employment centre] and the federal government, so that construction workers can receive training while they are receiving Employment Insurance benefits. He submits that information about the training is received by the CCQ employee and then submitted by that employee to their CLE, which then sends it to Service Canada to show that the course is properly managed.
[12] The Appellant argues that the General Division erred in finding that the Appellant did not have approval to take the course.
[13] The Respondent argues that leaving his employment to take a training course that was not approved by the Respondent does not constitute just cause under sections 29 and 30 of the Act.
[14] The Respondent submits that Emploi-Québec must authorize a claimant to leave their employment to take an approved course or training program and receive benefits. Both the approval of a course or training program and the authorization to voluntarily leave an employment to take an approved course, must be given separately. Authorization to leave an employment must be obtained before the claimant leaves and starts the course or training program.
General Division decision
[15] The General Division found that the Appellant did not have just cause for voluntarily leaving his employment on February 19, 2016, for training, without authorization from Emploi-Québec or the Respondent.
Did the General Division err when it concluded that the Appellant did not have just cause for voluntarily leaving his employment pursuant to sections 29 and 30 of the Act?
[16] It is important to note that under section 25 of the Act, leaving an employment to take a course authorized by the Respondent constitutes a statutory exception, according to which a claimant taking such a course is considered to be an unemployed claimant, capable of and available for work for the entire duration of the course.
[17] The claimant must therefore be authorized by the Respondent to take a training course (Canada v. Martel, A-1691-92; Canada (Attorney General) v. Tourangeau, 2001 FCA 293; and Canada (Attorney General) v. Beaulieu, FCA 2008 133).
[18] The Tribunal finds from the evidence that the Appellant repeatedly stated that he had been approved by Emploi-Québec to take the course, but that it had not given him permission to leave his employment. The CLE confirmed the Appellant's statements that he had been approved to take the course but not to leave his employment.
[19] In this case, the Appellant's course did not meet the criteria under section 25 of the Act. It was not a course to which the Respondent had referred the Appellant because he did not have prior authorization to leave his employment. The debate is therefore found in the context of section 29 of the Act.
[20] As noted by the General Division, according to settled case law from the Federal Court of Appeal, voluntarily leaving an employment to take a course that is not authorized by the Respondent does not constitute just cause, even if the claimant has excellent reasons for doing so—Bois v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FCA 175; Mancheron v. Canada (Attorney General), 2001 FCA 174; Caron v. Canada (Attorney General), 2007 FCA 204; and Trochimchuk v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FCA 268.
[21] The Federal Court of Appeals has many times reiterated that it is of the very essence of the Employment Insurance program "that the assured shall not deliberately create or increase the risk”—Smith v. Canada (Attorney General), (C.A.), 1997 CanLII 5451.
[22] In this case, the Appellant had clearly created the risk and he cannot impose the economic burden of his decision on the Employment Insurance funds.
[23] The Tribunal finds that the evidence submitted does not support the grounds of appeal invoked or any other possible ground of appeal. The General Division’s decision is based on the evidence brought before it, and its decision is consistent with the legislative provisions and case law.
[24] There is nothing to warrant the Tribunal’s intervention.
Conclusion
[25] The appeal is dismissed.