Employment Insurance (EI)

Decision

[1] The appeal is allowed. The Added Party was dismissed due to her own misconduct and must be disqualified from receiving benefits.

Overview

[2] The Added Party sent a letter to the Appellant dated January 24, 2017, requesting the amount of $175,000 in exchange for withdrawing an active complaint involving it and for abandoning all future complaints. After receiving this letter, the Appellant ended the employment of the Added Party because the relationship of trust had been broken. The [Respondent, the] Canada Employment Insurance Commission (Commission)[,] agreed to pay Employment Insurance benefits to the Added Party. The Commission reviewed this decision at the Appellant’s request, but upheld its initial decision. The Appellant is now appealing the decision. The Tribunal must determine whether the Appellant should be disqualified from receiving benefits because she lost her employment due to her own misconduct.

Preliminary matter

[3] The Added Party did not attend the hearing. According to her representative, she did not wish to attend the hearing.

Issues

[4] The parties recognize that the Added Party’s alleged act was sending the letter dated January 24, 2017 (GD2-12 to 15).

[5] Furthermore, it is undisputed that the Added Party sent this letter to the employer through the Commission des normes, de l’équité, de la santé et de la sécurité du travail (CNESST). As a result, there are two issues:

[6] Was it misconduct to send the letter to the employer?

[7] If it was, is there a causal relationship between sending the letter and the loss of the employment?

Analysis

[8] The relevant statutory provisions are appended to this decision.

[9] A claimant is disqualified from receiving any benefits if they were dismissed because of their misconduct (section 30 of the Employment Insurance Act (Act)). The concept of misconduct is not defined in the Act and must be considered on the basis of case law principles.

[10] Misconduct requires evidence of a mental element. The act leading to the dismissal must be wilful and deliberate or so reckless or negligent that “the employee willfully disregarded the effect her actions would have on job performance.” (Canada (Attorney General) v. Tucker, A-381-85).

[11] Several years later, the Federal Court of Appeal went into greater detail regarding this concept of the wilful nature of misconduct:

Put another way, there will be misconduct where the claimant knew or ought to have known that his conduct was such as to impair the performance of the duties owed to his employer and that, as a result, dismissal was a real possibility. (Mishibinijima v. Canada (Attorney General), 2007 FCA 36).

[12] The burden of proving misconduct by the preponderance of evidence rests on the employer’s shoulders. (Bartone, A369-88; Canada (Attorney General) v. Larivee, 2007 FCA 312; Meunier v. Canada (Employment and Immigration Commission), A-130-96).

[13] To determine whether misconduct has occurred, the Tribunal must examine and evaluate all of the facts and relevant circumstances leading to the dismissal. (Larivee, supra; Mishibinijima, supra).

[14] Misconduct is not a simple breach of duty within a particular employment. It must be of such scope that the claimant could normally foresee that they would be dismissed (Meunier, supra). The actions committed must be serious enough to constitute misconduct (Canada (Attorney General) v. Langlois, A-94-95).

[15] Misconduct is “a breach of an express or implied duty resulting from the contract of employment” (Attorney General of Canada v. Nolet, A-517-91).

[16] No criminal convictions are necessary for an act to constitute misconduct (Attorney General of Canada v. Granstrom, 2003 FCA 485; Larivee, supra).

Was it misconduct to send the letter to the employer?

[17] The central issue is that the Added Party sent a letter dated January 24, 2017, so it is worth summarizing the important facts at hand:

1. The Added Party had her partner, also her representative at the hearing, write the letter.
2. The Added Party informed the owner of the Appellant that complaints had been filed with the Commission des normes du travail du Québec - CNTQ (CNESST), to the Human Rights Commission, and to the Ordre des audioprothésistes.
3. Furthermore, the Added Party informed it that she had complaints on hold with Sûreté du Québec, the sexual assault centre, and to the Order of Chartered Professional Accountants.
4. The Added Party also informed the owner of the Appellant that she had informed a law firm about her case and that this firm was advising her and managing her case. Furthermore, this firm was ready to follow through with a severe civil lawsuit, depending on how the events proceeded.
5. The Added Party encouraged the owner of the Appellant to read the list of accusations calmly.
6. The Added Party explained that she had been the victim of psychological and sexual harassment committed by the owner of the Appellant. She described the events that she experienced in the Appellant’s office.
7. As a result, the Added Party alleges that the owner of the Appellant traumatized her, destabilized her, and made her uncomfortable. Her mental and physical health have also worsened significantly. The Added Party continued by explaining her heart problem and her diabetes.
8. The Added Party also explained the broken promise of S. L., the former owner of the Appellant. According to the letter, S. L. broke his promise to guarantee a job for the Added Party and her partner. By selling the company to the Appellant, he broke his promise.
9. In light of these accusations, the Added Party proposed two scenarios to the owner of the Appellant:
   1. 1) The Added Party will file a complaint with Sûreté de Québec for sexual harassment. A criminal record will be opened and the owner of the Appellant could be arrested. This cumbersome process would therefore involve a civil lawsuit against the owner of the Appellant. The Ordre des audioprothésistes would be informed of the details of the complaint. What impact would this complaint have on the future of the clinic? The Added Party also alluded to the possibility that social media networks might learn [translation] “of the complaint by accident.” The Added Party also asked the Appellant about the reaction of organizations that fight for women’s rights.
   2. Or, the Added Party asked the owner of the Appellant to be open-minded about the second scenario.
   3. 2) The Added Party would abandon the complaints and lawsuits already in motion and those on hold against the owner of the Appellant, S. L., the Appellant’s accountant, and the mother of the owner of the Appellant. Furthermore, the Added Party and her partner would agree to not reveal or file the lawsuits regarding the sexual and psychological harassment; the irregularity with which salaries were paid; the forms of intimidation used; the aggravated health problems; and the insecurity, in exchange for the sum of $175,000—in a tax-free single payment and accompanied by an apology letter—so that she could retire. The owner of the Appellant has caused the Added Party extreme physical and mental exhaustion. Furthermore, according to her doctor, the Added Party will not likely be able to work for much longer.
10. The Added Party reminded the owner of the Appellant that she could easily claim twice that amount through a civil lawsuit.
11. The Added Party signed this letter and authorized CNESST to forward it to the Appellant.

[18] After receiving this letter, the Appellant terminated the employment of the Added Party. The Appellant issued a letter of dismissal dated January 31, 2017, that describes the facts leading up to the end of the employment (GD2-9 to 11):

1. January 13, 2017: CNESST informed the Appellant that the Added Party had filed three complaints: a psychological harassment complaint, a monetary complaint, and a complaint regarding a pay statement.
2. January 16, 2017: The Added Party returned from vacation and from a family-related absence and asked the Appellant whether she could work or whether she should leave. The Appellant responded that she could work and that it was open to discussing the complaints.
3. January 18, 2017: The Appellant agreed to take part in CNESST mediation to better understand the facts involved in the complaints so that it could address them. However, the Added Party demanded that the owner of the Appellant attend as well, but he was not available on the scheduled meeting date.
4. January 20, 2017: The Appellant suggested a new date to the CNESST mediator/investigator, who informed it that the Added Party no longer wished to take part in mediation. She would meet with the mediator with her partner.
5. January 20, 2017: The Added Party had a negative attitude and made mistakes, so the Appellant proposed, through the mediator, to suspend her with pay until the scheduled meeting date.
6. January 20, 2017: The Added Party’s partner called to inform the Appellant that flowers would be delivered to the office due to the passing of the Added Party’s mother a few weeks earlier and that they would come pick them up later.
7. January 20, 2017: The Added Party came to pick up the flowers at the reception and went to her office. After she left, the Appellant noticed that the Added Party had left a greeting card from her in-laws, who are legal experts, in plain view.
8. January 26, 2017: CNESST forwarded to the Appellant the letter dated January 24, 2017.
9. According to the Appellant, this letter of proposals based on dishonest allegations and threats of unfounded lawsuits irrevocably broke the essential bond of trust between an employer and its employee.

[19] At the hearing, the appealing party had several witnesses testify to show that the allegations described in the January 24, 2017, letter were false and that the owner of the Appellant did not commit acts of sexual harassment towards the Added Party.

[20] The Added Party’s representative tried to show that the Added Party had been the victim of sexual harassment. He argued that sending the letter was justified by the Added Party’s experiences.

[21] The Tribunal would like to make it clear that it is not responsible for determining whether the Added Party was the victim of sexual harassment or not. The Tribunal must determine whether the Added Party voluntarily sent the January 24, 2017, letter, and if she did, whether she knew or should have known that she would be dismissed in doing so.

Wilful nature of the actions

[22] The Appellant feels that it fulfilled its burden of proof regarding the wilful nature of the act because the Added Party wilfully sent the letter to the CNESST so that it would send the letter to the Appellant.

[23] The Commission feels that, based on the preponderance of probabilities, the Added Party did not deliberately take actions intended to harm the employer–employee relationship.

[24] The Added Party made no argument regarding the wilful nature of her actions.

[25] The Tribunal finds that the Added Party wilfully sent the letter dated January 24, 2017, to the Appellant.

[26] First, the evidence shows that the Added Party had her partner write the letter dated January 24, 2017, and signed it herself.

[27] Then, this letter was forwarded to the Appellant at her request through CNESST. Sending this letter was therefore not the result of an involuntary action, but rather the result of the Added Party’s intention to send it to the Appellant.

[28] The Tribunal then identified, based on all of the testimony heard, that the Added Party had not been in her usual mental state after returning from the leave she took regarding the passing of her mother in January 2017. Did this mental state make sending the letter involuntary? The Tribunal does not believe so, because her partner helped her send the letter. The Added Party’s partner played an active role in the various claims, and he was aware of the entire case. Her partner was familiar with the workplace, the parties involved, and the problems that the Added Party had experienced. Sending the letter was therefore deliberate, because not only does the proof of the Added Party’s mental state not show that sending the letter was involuntary, but the Added Party also had the assistance of her partner.

[29] The Tribunal therefore finds that the Added Party voluntarily sent the letter to the Appellant (Tucker, supra).

Knew or should have known that sending the letter would lead to her dismissal

[30] At this point, the Tribunal must determine whether the Added Party knew or should have known that she could have been dismissed if she sent the letter to the Appellant.

[31] According to the Commission, the timeline described in the dismissal letter dated January 31, 2017—the process of suspension with pay and dismissal—began after the Added Party filed her complaints. The letter dated January 24, 2017, is also a rather clumsy attempt to address the problem with her employer because she had been on forced leave since January 20, 2017. The facts show a serious conflict between the Appellant and the Added Party that brought about a cascade of actions that led to her dismissal. According to the Commission, it is not possible to show that the actions were intentional or negligent to the point of constituting a breach of an express or implied duty under the employment contract.

[32] According to the Added Party, the letter dated January 24, 2017, is just a simple suggestion or proposal to the Appellant. The Added Party’s representative argues that you would have to have a twisted, unhealthy mind to find that the letter was an attempt at extortion. Why would they have met with Sûreté du Québec with all the documents if it was a matter of extortion? They would be shooting themselves in the foot. According to the Added Party, their intentions were commendable. Besides, all the Appellant had to do was answer “no” to their proposal. The Added Party’s representative added that the amount of $175,000 was the result of a request to the CNESST to quantify their claim.

[33] According to the Appellant, the Added Party knew that sending the letter would lead to the end of her employment because she made a point of emptying her office before she sent the letter, as if she would not be returning to work. Furthermore, the letter dated January 24, 2017, is an effort for her to squeeze $175,000 out of it and constitutes a sufficiently serious error for the Added Party to know that she could have been dismissed for acting in such a way. The Added Party and her partner were also angry with the Appellant and with S. L. as a result of the sale of the clinic, the changes to the workplace duties, the changes to the payment method, the relocation of the clinic, the fact that the owner of the Appellant was an intern, and the loss of the cleaning contracts of the Added Party’s partner.

[34] The Appellant questioned the credibility of the Added Party’s representative, who testified in this case. Having heard all of the testimony before he himself testified, the representative adapted his version of the facts based on the facts in evidence. The Appellant also invited the Tribunal to exercise care with regard to the representative’s testimony because he primarily relayed the words of the Added Party without personal knowledge of the facts. Finally, the Appellant argued that the evidence that the Added Party presented was not corroborated and that the representative refused to answer questions that could have confirmed his version of the facts. According to the Appellant, this refusal to answer affected the credibility of the Added Party’s representative. The Added Party’s representative did actually refuse to give the name of the florist who delivered the flowers on January 20, 2017, and the name of the members of the family who were legal experts.

[35] To determine whether the Added Party knew or should have known that she would be dismissed, the Tribunal must first evaluate the nature of letter in question: Was it an effort at negotiation or extortion? The nature of the letter will show the Added Party’s intention and, as a result, to what degree she knew that her dismissal was a possibility.

[36] The Tribunal finds that the letter dated January 24, 2017, is not an effort to negotiate or a settlement proposal, but rather an effort to obtain $175,000 from the Appellant through threats of criminal, civil, and disciplinary measures and damage to its reputation. 

[37] First, the fact that the Added Party submitted two possible scenarios to the Appellant clearly shows that it was not a proposal as part of negotiations. In the first scenario, the Added Party lays out all of the lawsuits that she intended to file and all of the possible consequences that might face the clinic and the owner of the Appellant. In this scenario, the Added Party makes no proposals to resolve the conflict with the Appellant; she only lays out possible lawsuits.

[38] In the second scenario, the Added Party would abandon the lawsuits described in the first scenario if the Appellant paid her the sum of $175,000. The Added Party and her partner therefore threatened to sue the Appellant for an amount of money. This aspect argues in favour of extortion.

[39] The Added Party’s representative tried to diminish the scope of the letter by arguing that it was just a simple suggestion and that the Appellant only had to refuse it. The Tribunal cannot accept the Added Party’s claim because the letter clearly shows a demand for money in exchange for not putting these threats into motion.  

[40] Secondly, the letter does not propose any avenues to end the conflict with the Appellant or at least begin a discussion process.

[41] On one hand, the two scenarios do not address the conflict with regard to the complaints submitted to the CNESST. To tell the truth, the Added Party simply agreed to withdraw those complaints (and not to file other complaints) in exchange for $175,000. So, the letter was not written to start a discussion in order to resolve the conflict, because she only aimed to do so superficially. The Tribunal cannot accept the simple statement from the Added Party’s representative that the amount of $175,000 was established at the CNESST’s request.

[42] On the other hand, the Added Party does not explain what the sum of $175,000 represents, other than for dropping existing complaints and waiving subsequent complaints. The sum of $175,000 was not itemized or even basically explained. A presentation of the sum of $175,000 would have allowed the Appellant to assess how reasonable the amount was so that it could make the Added Party a counter-offer. The Added Party simply mentioned in the letter that it was an amount for her to retire. Not only did the Added Party still work for the Appellant at that point, but she does not explain how this amount would allow her to retire, either.

[43] Moreover, the claimed amount of $175,000 is not explained with relation to the complaints submitted to the CNESST. In the letter, the Added Party makes no connection between the amount for her to retire and the complaints to the CNESST, which deal primarily with psychological harassment, monetary complaints, and complaints regarding her pay statements. Because the claimed amount is not related to the workplace conflict, it cannot therefore constitute an offer.

[44] The Tribunal finds that the fact that the letter was not sent in an effort to resolve the conflict shows that it was not an effort to negotiate, but rather an attempt at extortion or a threat.

[45] Thirdly, the Tribunal finds that the rather aggressive and pushy nature of the letter shows the Added Party’s intention to extract money in exchange for her silence and the withdrawal of the complaints.

[46] The choice of words in the letter gives it a threatening and intimidating tone.

[47] For example, the Added Party and her partner informed the Appellant that a law firm had been briefed about the case and were advising and guiding the case and that the law firm was waiting to file a severe civil lawsuit, depending on how the events played out. The Added Party wanted the Appellant to know that she was represented by a number of lawyers. For the Tribunal, this reference adds a shade of intimidation to the letter, rather than the opening of a discussion.

[48] Furthermore, in her description of the first scenario, the Added Party threatened the Appellant that she would go meet with an investigator from Sûreté du Québec and that the owner of the Appellant [translation] “would be arrested, it was likely. [...] Also, how would the public react if certain social media were to hear about this pathetic story.” To the Tribunal, it is clearly a threat to damage the Appellant’s reputation on social media.

[49] Also, at the very end of the letter, the Added Party and her partner reminded the Appellant that a civil lawsuit could easily bring them double the amount of $175,000.

[50] These three quotations show the aggressive nature of the letter, which is more of a letter where a person aims to squeeze money out of someone through threats, rather than a letter making an offer.

[51] Fourthly, the Added Party’s credibility with regard to the nature of the letter is doubtful. The Added Party’s representative argued that it was important to denounce sexual aggression and lamented the fact that victims are often the last ones people believe. The Added Party’s representative was prepared to silence his partner and valued her silence at $175,000. For the Tribunal, this was a major contradiction in the Added Party’s claim. The Added Party’s representative cannot claim to defend the rights of victims of sexual aggression and sell the silence of his partner to her own alleged aggressor. This contradiction emphasized the fact that the letter was not an effort to negotiate.

[52] Furthermore, the Added Party’s representative claimed that it would be senseless to write an extortion letter and to submit it to the Sûreté de Québec investigator when they went to file their complaint. However, the Tribunal does not have evidence that the letter was submitted to a Sûreté du Québec agent or in what context.

[53] The analysis of the January 24, 2017, letter shows that, contrary to the claims of the Added Party and the Commission, it was not an effort, even a clumsy one, to negotiate the end of a workplace conflict. 

[54] Considering that the letter sent was not an effort to negotiate, but is rather a part of an extortion attempt, the Tribunal finds that the Added Party knew or should have known that she would be dismissed.

[55] In fact, the filing of the letter is not just a simple failure to fulfill an obligation under an employment contract (Langlois, supra). The Added Party could not therefore be unaware that she would be dismissed as a result of the severity of the committed actions (Meunier, supra; Nolet, supra). An employee cannot threaten their employer that they will file criminal and disciplinary complaints and pursue serious civil lawsuits if the employer does not pay them a sum of money and think that they will keep their job.

[56] The Added Party’s behaviour is a serious act that broke the bond of trust between her and the Appellant. The owner of the Appellant testified that he could no longer trust the Appellant to perform her duties.

[57] Furthermore, the Tribunal finds that the Added Party’s behaviour shows that she was aware of the content and the gravity of the letter dated January 24, 2017. In her initial application, the Added Party did not inform the Commission that this letter had been sent to explain her dismissal. The Added Party stated to the Commission that she had been dismissed because of a complaint submitted to the CNESST, the Human Rights Commission, to the Ordre des audioprothésistes, and to Sûreté du Québec. Not only does the evidence show that the Appellant only knew of the complaints to the CNESST at the time of dismissal, but furthermore, the Added Party completely disregarded the January 24, 2017, letter that was clearly identified in the dismissal letter as the reason for the end of her employment. The Tribunal finds that the Added Party failed to mention the letter because she knew that it was not in her favour for the handling of her file. As a result, she was aware of the content of this letter and she should have known that she would be dismissed (Mishibinijima, supra; Langlois, supra).

[58] The Commission argued that the Added Party could only have known that she would be dismissed because the letter is part of a timeline of events as mentioned in the dismissal letter. It is true that the Added Party and the Appellant had a workplace conflict that had begun with a complaint to the CNESST. The Added Party argued that the Appellant was closed to mediation related to her complaints.

[59] Contrary to the Added Party’s claims, the evidence shows that the Appellant was open to resolving the conflict with the CNESST. The Appellant did agree to take part in a mediation meeting with the Added Party, but had to reschedule because the owner of the Appellant was not available on that date. A few days later, when the Appellant contacted the CNESST, the CNESST informed it that the Added Party did not want to participate in the mediation any longer. Furthermore, when the Appellant suspended the Added Party with pay, it did so with the CNESST’s approval.

[60] Therefore, the Appellant’s involvement in the mediation shows that the complaints to the CNESST are not the starting point of the dismissal and are not part of the timeline of events that led to the dismissal.  

[61] Furthermore, the Tribunal already found during its analysis of the nature of the letter that it was not part of a negotiation process to solve the workplace conflict.

[62] The Added Party’s representative argued that the letter was not misconduct because sexual assault took place. However, it is not up to the Tribunal to determine whether the Added Party was justified in sending the letter; the Tribunal must determine whether the Added Party knew or should have known that she could be dismissed for sending the letter.

[63] It is not up to the Tribunal to determine whether the facts related to the letter are true or not, either. Moreover, even if the allegations in the letter are true, the Added Party knew that she would be dismissed when she sent a threatening letter of this scale to her employer (Mishibinijima, supra).

[64] Considering that the January 24, 2017, letter was voluntarily and knowingly sent to the Appellant; that the letter is an effort to obtain $175,000 from the Appellant through threats of lawsuits; and that this letter constitutes a serious breach of conduct, the Added Party knew or should have known that she would be dismissed. The Appellant is relieved of its burden of proof to show that the Added Party committed misconduct (Bartone, supra; Larivee, supra; Meunier, supra).

[65] The Tribunal must therefore determine whether there is a causal relationship between the misconduct and the loss of employment.

If so, is there a causal relationship between the sending of the letter and the loss of employment

[66] Proof of misconduct does not automatically entail disqualification under the [EI] Act. There must be a causal relationship between this misconduct and the claimant’s dismissal. The misconduct must be the cause of the dismissal and not simply a pretext to dismiss an employee (The Attorney General of Canada v. Brissette, A-1342-92).

[67] The Tribunal must objectively analyze the evidence to determine whether the misconduct is really the cause of the dismissal (Meunier, supra). “The relationship between employment and misconduct is not one of timing, but one of causation (Canada (Attorney General) v. McNamara, 2007 FCA 107).”

[68] So, the Tribunal “must be satisfied that the misconduct was the reason for the dismissal not the excuse for it. This requirement necessitates a factual determination after weighing all of the evidence.” (Davlut v. Attorney General of Canada, A-241-82).

[69] The Commission claimed that the Added Party had been dismissed because of complaints to the CNESST. There is therefore no relationship of causation, but rather a relationship of timing.

[70] The Tribunal does not agree with the Commission’s claim. First, the Tribunal already explained that the letter was not sent in the context of resolving the complaints filed with the CNESST. Moreover, the Appellant showed that it was open to resolving this conflict. The Appellant’s behaviour does not show that it took advantage of the sending of the letter to dismiss the Added Party for the complaints (Davlut, supra; Meunier, supra).

[71] The Appellant ended the Added Party’s employment because she broke the bond of trust. It is a breach of an implicit duty under an employment contract (Brissette, supra; Nolet, supra). The owner of the Appellant testified that after receiving this letter, it could not keep the Added Party in its employ because it could no longer trust her to prepare orders, to take meetings, or to ensure that the clinic’s patients were well-served. So, due to the breaking of the bond of trust by sending the letter dated January 24, 2017, the Appellant can no longer let the Added Party perform her duties. The dismissal is therefore the result of the misconduct and not a matter of timing (McNamara, supra). 

[72] The Appellant could not keep the Added Party in its employ because the sending of the letter dated January 24, 2017, broke the bond of trust. The Added Party was therefore dismissed for sending this letter. The Tribunal finds that there is a causal relationship between the misconduct and the dismissal.

Conclusion

[73] The appeal is allowed. The Tribunal finds that the Added Party committed misconduct that led to her dismissal.

Appendix

The law

Employment Insurance Act

1. 29 For the purposes of sections 30 to 33,
   1. (a) employment refers to any employment of the claimant within their qualifying period or their benefit period;
   2. (b) loss of employment includes a suspension from employment, but does not include loss of, or suspension from, employment on account of membership in, or lawful activity connected with, an association, organization or union of workers;
   3. (b.1) voluntarily leaving an employment includes
      1. (i) the refusal of employment offered as an alternative to an anticipated loss of employment, in which case the voluntary leaving occurs when the loss of employment occurs,
      2. (ii) the refusal to resume an employment, in which case the voluntary leaving occurs when the employment is supposed to be resumed, and
      3. (iii) the refusal to continue in an employment after the work, undertaking or business of the employer is transferred to another employer, in which case the voluntary leaving occurs when the work, undertaking or business is transferred; and
   4. (c) just cause for voluntarily leaving an employment or taking leave from an employment exists if the claimant had no reasonable alternative to leaving or taking leave, having regard to all the circumstances, including any of the following:
      1. (i) sexual or other harassment,
      2. (ii) obligation to accompany a spouse, common-law partner or dependent child to another residence,
      3. (iii) discrimination on a prohibited ground of discrimination within the meaning of the Canadian Human Rights Act,
      4. (iv) working conditions that constitute a danger to health or safety,
      5. (v) obligation to care for a child or a member of the immediate family,
      6. (vi) reasonable assurance of another employment in the immediate future,
      7. (vii) significant modification of terms and conditions respecting wages or salary,
      8. (viii) excessive overtime work or refusal to pay for overtime work,
      9. (ix) significant changes in work duties,
      10. (x) antagonism with a supervisor if the claimant is not primarily responsible for the antagonism,
      11. (xi) practices of an employer that are contrary to law,
      12. (xii) discrimination with regard to employment because of membership in an association, organization or union of workers,
      13. (xiii) undue pressure by an employer on the claimant to leave their employment, and
      14. (xiv) any other reasonable circumstances that are prescribed.
2. 30 (1) A claimant is disqualified from receiving any benefits if the claimant lost any employment because of their misconduct or voluntarily left any employment without just cause, unless
   1. (a) the claimant has, since losing or leaving the employment, been employed in insurable employment for the number of hours required by section 7 or 7.1 to qualify to receive benefits; or
   2. (b) the claimant is disentitled under sections 31 to 33 in relation to the employment.
3. (2) The disqualification is for each week of the claimant’s benefit period following the waiting period and, for greater certainty, the length of the disqualification is not affected by any subsequent loss of employment by the claimant during the benefit period.
4. (3) If the event giving rise to the disqualification occurs during a benefit period of the claimant, the disqualification does not include any week in that benefit period before the week in which the event occurs.
5. (4) Notwithstanding subsection (6), the disqualification is suspended during any week for which the claimant is otherwise entitled to special benefits.
6. (5) If a claimant who has lost or left an employment as described in subsection (1) makes an initial claim for benefits, the following hours may not be used to qualify under section 7 or 7.1 to receive benefits:
7. (6) No hours of insurable employment in any employment that a claimant loses or leaves, as described in subsection (1), may be used for the purpose of determining the maximum number of weeks of benefits under subsection 12(2) or the claimant’s rate of weekly benefits under section 14.
8. (7) For greater certainty, but subject to paragraph (1)(a), a claimant may be disqualified under subsection (1) even if the claimant’s last employment before their claim for benefits was not lost or left as described in that subsection and regardless of whether their claim is an initial claim for benefits.