Employment Insurance (EI)

Decision

[1] Leave (permission) to appeal is refused. The appeal will not proceed.

Overview

[2] I. T. is the Claimant in this case. He applied for and received Employment Insurance (EI) parental benefits. On his application, he had to choose between two parental benefit options: standard or extended.^{Footnote 1}

[3] The application form explained how the standard option offers a higher benefit rate, paid for up to 35 weeks. The extended option offers a lower benefit rate, paid for up to 61 weeks.

[4] The Claimant wanted 17 weeks of benefits, so he chose the standard option to get the higher benefit rate. However, the Canada Employment Insurance Commission (Commission) stopped his benefits after just two weeks.^{Footnote 2} It said that, under the standard option, it could not pay benefits to the Claimant beyond his child’s first birthday.

[5] So, the Claimant asked to switch to the extended option. The Commission refused the Claimant’s request. The Commission said that it was too late for the Claimant to change options because it had already paid him some parental benefits.

[6] The Claimant successfully appealed the Commission’s decision to the Tribunal’s General Division. The General Division found that the Commission misled the Claimant, that his application form did not reveal a clear choice between the two options, and that the Commission failed to provide the Claimant with notice of its decision.

[7] The Commission now wants to appeal the General Division decision to the Tribunal’s Appeal Division. But the Commission needs permission to appeal for the file to move forward.

[8] The Commission argues that the General Division contains errors of law. It also argues that the General Division exceeded its powers.

[9] The Commission’s appeal has no reasonable chance of success. I have no choice, then, but to refuse permission to appeal.

Issues

[10] My decision focuses on these issues:

1. a) Could the General Division have made an error of law when it decided that the Commission’s application form misled the Claimant?
2. b) Could the General Division have exceeded its powers by allowing the Claimant to be paid parental benefits under the extended option?

Analysis

[11] Most Appeal Division files follow a two-step process. This appeal is at step one: permission to appeal.

[12] The legal test that the Commission needs to meet at this step is a low one: Is there any arguable ground on which the appeal might succeed?^{Footnote 3} If the appeal has no reasonable chance of success, then I must refuse permission to appeal.^{Footnote 4}

[13] To decide this question, I considered whether the General Division could have made an error of law or jurisdiction, which are among the errors that I can consider. ^{Footnote 5}

There is no arguable case that the General Division made an error of law when it decided that the Commission’s application form misled the Claimant

[14] The General Division found that the Claimant chose standard parental benefits. However, it found that his choice was invalid. To get to its conclusion, the General Division focused on three main points.

[15] First, the Commission’s application form was missing critical information, which misled the Claimant into making the wrong choice.

[16] The Commission’s application form offered the Claimant up to 35 weeks of standard parental benefits paid at a higher rate. Or, he could receive up to 61 weeks of extended parental benefits paid at a lower rate. Since the Claimant wanted 17 weeks of benefits, he obviously chose the standard option.

[17] However, nowhere did the Commission’s application form tell the Claimant that, under the standard option, the Commission would have to stop paying him benefits when his child turned one. This was critical information for the Claimant because he submitted his application shortly before his child’s first birthday. In contrast, by choosing the extended option, the Claimant could have received the 17 weeks of benefits that he wanted (albeit at the lower rate).

[18] The General Division concluded that this lack of critical information misled the Claimant into make the wrong choice.

[19] Second, the Commission should have followed up with the Claimant because his application contained a glaring contradiction that cast doubt over his choice.

[20] On his application, the Claimant asked for 17 weeks of standard parental benefits, but the law only allowed the Commission to pay him for two of those weeks. In other words, the Claimant applied for something that the application form seemed to permit, but the law forbid. So, the General Division found that the Commission should have contacted the Claimant to clarify his choice.

[21] And third, the Commission didn’t notify the Claimant about an important part of its decision.

[22] The Claimant provided evidence from the Commission’s website about the Commission’s approval of his claim and how it ended a year after it had started. However, there were no hints that the Commission would only pay parental benefits to the Claimant for two of the 17 weeks that he had requested.

[23] The General Division found that, by proceeding as it did, the Commission took away the Claimant’s chance to change parental benefit options in a timely way.

[24] Regardless of these problems, the Commission argues that the General Division failed to apply legal principles that put more responsibility on applicants for parental benefits. The Commission says that, if the General Division had applied these principles, it could not have concluded that the Commission misled the Claimant.

[25] First, the Commission maintains that the Claimant needed to carefully read about his options, attempt to understand them, and ask questions when needed.^{Footnote 6} And second, it says that the General Division failed to apply the principle that ignorance of the law is not an excuse. In the Commission’s view, the General Division should have considered that the Claimant knew that his benefits would stop when his child turned a year old because it is part of the law.^{Footnote 7}

[26] The Commission’s arguments have no reasonable chance of success.

[27] The General Division did not find that the Claimant was ignorant of the law and excuse him for this. Nor is this a case about the Claimant’s failure to comply with a legal requirement.

[28] Instead, this case is about the Claimant’s choice. It is also about the Commission’s obligations:

• to avoid providing misleading information about a person’s choice, and
• to follow up when a person’s choice is unclear.

[29] Indeed, the Karval decision that the Commission relies on is careful to distinguish between people who lack the knowledge to answer clear questions and those who are misled by relying on incomplete information from the Commission.^{Footnote 8}

[30] Plus, the facts in Karval were different. In Karval, it was very clear that the applicant had chosen the extended option, so the Commission had no hint that she might be confused.^{Footnote 9} In this case, however, the Claimant asked for 17 weeks of standard parental benefits, which is something that the law didn’t allow.

[31] There is no arguable case that the General Division failed to apply the legal principles that the Commission is alleging. Those principles do not apply to this case.

There is no arguable case that the General Division exceeded its powers

[32] The Commission argues that the General Division went beyond its powers by:

• considering the validity of the Claimant’s election; and
• effectively allowing the Claimant to change options after receiving parental benefits.^{Footnote 10}

[33] These arguments have no reasonable chance of success.

[34] The General Division has the power to decide any question of law or fact that is needed to resolve an appeal.^{Footnote 11} This includes the ability to consider all of the evidence to determine if the Claimant made a clear and valid choice.

[35] The General Division also recognized that a person can’t change options after starting to receive parental benefits.^{Footnote 12}

[36] However, the General Division decided to follow a series of Appeal Division decisions that say that, in some situations, an applicant’s choice is invalid from the beginning.^{Footnote 13} In other words, the Claimant never validly chose between the standard and extended options. This is different from allowing the Claimant to change options.

[37] The General Division was not obliged to follow these decisions, but it found no reason to depart from them.

[38] In the circumstances, there is no arguable case that the General Division exceeded its powers.

[39] Aside from the Commission’s arguments, I have reviewed the file and examined the General Division decision.^{Footnote 14}

[40] The evidence supports the General Division’s decision. I did not find evidence that the General Division might have ignored or misinterpreted. Finally, the Commission has not argued that the General Division acted unfairly in any way.

Conclusion

[41] I have decided that the Commission’s appeal has no reasonable chance of success. I have no choice, then, but to refuse permission to appeal. This means that the appeal will not proceed.