Employment Insurance (EI)

Decision Information

Decision Content

Citation: ES v Canada Employment Insurance Commission, 2024 SST 77

Social Security Tribunal of Canada
Appeal Division

Leave to Appeal Decision

Applicant: E. S.
Respondent: Canada Employment Insurance Commission

Decision under appeal: General Division decision dated May 31, 2023
(GE-23-698)

Tribunal member: Janet Lew
Decision date: January 25, 2024
File number: AD-23-651

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Decision

[1] Leave (permission) to appeal is refused. The appeal will not be going ahead.

Overview

[2] The Applicant, E. S. (Claimant) is seeking permission to appeal the General Division decision.

[3] The General Division dismissed the Claimant’s appeal. It found that the Claimant could not collect parental benefits because he did not apply for them on time. It found that he had applied for these benefits outside of what it referred to as the “parental benefit window,” the window of time when it said he could collect these kinds of benefits.

[4] The Claimant argues that the General Division made procedural and legal errors. In particular, he says that the General Division did not give him a fair hearing. He says that he did not get a chance to present his case because the General Division member would not allow him to present evidence or make arguments regarding his wife’s claim. He also argues that the General Division decision was insufficient, in that it did not let him understand how the member arrived at her decision.

[5] The Claimant also says that the General Division made a legal error because it failed to consider his wife’s claim for parental leave. He says that his wife’s and his own claims are inextricably linked. His says his wife’s parental benefit period was extended, so he says that he should have been able to rely on this fact so that he too would get an extension of the parental benefit window. The Claimant says that there is no legal justification to deny him an additional extension of the parental benefit window.Footnote 1

[6] Before the Claimant can move ahead with the appeal, I have to decide whether the appeal has a reasonable chance of success. In other words, there has to be an arguable case.Footnote 2 If the appeal does not have a reasonable chance of success, this ends the matter.Footnote 3

[7] I am not satisfied that the appeal has a reasonable chance of success. Therefore, I am not giving permission to the Claimant to move ahead with the appeal.

Issues

[8] The issues are as follows:

  1. (a) Is there an arguable case that the General Division process was unfair?
  2. (b) Is there an arguable case that the General Division should have considered the Claimant’s spouse’s benefits claim?
  3. (c) Is there an arguable case that the General Division did not have any legal justification to deny the Claimant a further extension of the parental benefit window?

I am not giving the Claimant permission to appeal

[9] The Appeal Division must grant permission to appeal unless the appeal has no reasonable chance of success. A reasonable chance of success exists if the General Division arguably made a jurisdictional, procedural, legal, or a certain type of factual error.Footnote 4

[10] For this type of factual error, the General Division had to have based its decision on an error that it made in a perverse or capricious manner, or without regard for the evidence before it.

The Claimant does not have an arguable case that the General Division process was unfair

Fair hearing

[11] The Claimant argues that the General Division did not give him a fair hearing. He says that he did not get a chance to fully present his case. He wanted to give evidence and argue that because his wife had received an extension of the parental benefit window, that he too should have received an extension. The Claimant argues that his wife’s claim was inextricably tied to his and that her claim impacted his. Instead, he says that the General Division refused to let the Claimant advance these arguments.

[12] Furthermore, the Claimant alleges that the Respondent, the Canada Employment Insurance Commission (Commission), in its reconsideration decision, “specifically references as a basis for its decision that while his wife was entitled to an extension of her benefits, that [he] was not.”Footnote 5 He says that he should have been allowed to argue these issues because the Commission raised them in its reconsideration decision.

[13] In fact, the Commission’s reconsideration decision does not refer to the Claimant’s spouse at all. The decision is quite brief and simply says that the Commission is maintaining its initial decision of December 22, 2022, on the parental benefits issue.Footnote 6 The Commission’s initial decision also does not make any reference to the Claimant’s wife’s claim.Footnote 7

[14] Aside from this, the Claimant maintains that his claim is necessarily related to his wife’s claim.

[15] The Claimant’s claim for parental benefits is, to some extent, tied to his spouse’s claim. For instance, a parent’s election of either standard or extended parental benefits is binding on the other parent, if that other parent also claims parental benefits. For instance, one parent cannot get extended benefits if the other parent has already elected to receive standard benefits.

[16] However, that does not mean that everything that relates to the Claimant’s spouse’s claim is relevant. In the case of a parent who seeks an extension of the parental benefit window, the Employment Insurance Act clearly spells out when benefits may be paid and when payment of parental benefits ends—and neither relates to nor is dependent upon whether the other parent received an extension of benefits.

[17] It is clear that the General Division determined that the Claimant’s wife’s circumstances were irrelevant. Furthermore, her circumstances were necessarily different because she had also received compassionate care benefits and maternity benefits, before receiving parental benefits.

[18] The General Division is the master of their own proceedings. They can limit evidence and arguments when they consider them irrelevant. As the General Division determined that the Claimant’s wife’s circumstances were irrelevant to the issues before it, the General Division was entitled to re-direct the Claimant’s focus to issues that were relevant.

[19] Besides, the Claimant was not limited to filing supporting evidence or arguments. The Social Security Tribunal allowed him and he could have filed supporting documents before the hearing.

[20] I am not satisfied that the Claimant has an arguable case that he did not get a fair hearing or chance to fully present his case.

Sufficiency of reasons

[21] The Claimant also argues that the General Division’s reasons are insufficient. He says that he cannot understand how the General Division came to its decision. He says that he is entitled to some justification.

[22] To determine whether the General Division decision as a whole is reasonable, I have to examine whether it “bears the hallmarks of reasonableness—justification, , transparency and intelligibility—and whether it is justified in relation to the relevant factual and legal constraints that bear on the decision [citation omitted].”Footnote 8 A reasonable decision has to be based on internally coherent reasoning.

[23] As the Supreme Court of Canada has held, “reasons are the means by which the decision-maker communicates the rationale for its decision: they explain how and why a decision was made, help to show affected parties that their arguments have been considered and that the decision was made in a fair and lawful manner, and shield against arbitrariness.”Footnote 9

[24] The General Division set out the legal and evidentiary rationale for its decision. It identified the applicable provisions of the Employment Insurance Act and applied them to the facts of the case.

[25] The General Division firstly considered the Claimant’s parental benefit window. It calculated the window based on the appropriate section of the Employment Insurance Act (section 23.(2)). That section defines when the parental benefit window begins and ordinarily ends. In the case of the Claimant, the parental benefit window would have ordinarily ended 52 weeks after the week in which his child was born. The General Division properly explained this.

[26] The General Division then addressed the parties’ arguments about extending the Claimant’s parental benefit window. The General Division identified the circumstances under the Employment Insurance Act when an extension is available. Extensions are available when the child is hospitalized, or if the claimant is a member of the Canadian Forces who has to return to duty, or if the claimant is collecting more than one kind of special benefit.

[27] The Commission argued for a five-week extension, based on the evidence that the Claimant’s child had been hospitalized during five calendar weeks. The General Division noted the Claimant’s evidence that his child had been hospitalized on other occasions, but the Claimant did not provide supporting evidence of these other dates.

[28] The General Division accepted that a five-week extension of the parental benefit window based on the Claimant’s child’s hospitalization was appropriate. The General Division explained that this meant that the parental window was extended to September 3, 2022.

[29] The General Division then considered whether other conditions existed to allow for further extensions. The General Division noted that the Claimant did not fall into any other categories that would have allowed for a further extension of the parental benefit window. The General Division noted that the Claimant was not a Canadian Forces member called to duty and that he had not received other special benefits.

[30] The General Division then turned its mind to whether the Claimant could collect parental benefits. However, it determined that the Claimant could only get benefits within the parental benefit window. This interpretation of section 23(2) of the Employment Insurance Act regarding payment of parental benefits is consistent with the Federal Court of Appeal’s finding in a case called MartinFootnote 10 that benefits are paid within the parental benefit window.

[31] The General Division found that the Claimant had applied for parental benefits on November 17, 2022. The General Division noted that the Claimant last worked on October 10, 2022, and that the Commission started the Claimant’s benefit period on October 9, 2022.

[32] The General Division noted that the Claimant’s benefit window started on October 9, 2022, after his parental benefit window had already ended, on September 3, 2022. But the Employment Insurance Act restricts when one can get parental benefits. As the General Division further noted, no one can get parental benefits outside the parental benefit window. As the parental benefit window had closed on the Claimant, this meant that he could not get parental benefits.

[33] The General Division also addressed the Claimant’s arguments that he had received misleading information from the Commission. The General Division explained that it has limited authority and that it could not provide remedies to correct these types of situations.

[34] The General Division explained the rationale for its decision. There is an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and its decision is justified in relation to the facts and law. I am not satisfied that the Claimant has an arguable case that the General Division’s reasons were insufficient.

The Claimant does not have an arguable case that the General Division failed to consider his wife’s benefits claim

[35] The Claimant argues that the General Division failed to consider his wife’s benefits claim.

[36] However, as I have noted above, her benefits claim was not relevant to whether the Claimant could get a further extension of the number of weeks of the window within which parental benefits were payable.

[37] As the Court of Appeal held in Martin, “subsections 22(3) to 23(3.3) [of the Employment Insurance Act] provide for exceptions to subsection 23(2) and provide for limited extensions of the 52-week period in which the parental benefits may be paid.”Footnote 11 In short, there are limited extensions.

[38] Nothing in sections 22(3) to 23(3.3) of the Employment Insurance Act provides for an extension based on the circumstances of a claimant’s spouse, including whether that spouse received an extension of the parental benefit window. So, the fact that the Claimant’s wife received an extension was irrelevant.

[39] I am not satisfied that the General Division failed to consider the Claimant’s spouse’s claim.

The Claimant does not have an arguable case that the General Division did not have any legal justification to deny him a further extension of the parental benefit window

[40] The Claimant argues that the General Division did not have any legal justification to deny him a further extension of the parental benefit window.

[41] The Employment Insurance Act provides for extensions, but they are limited.Footnote 12 The General Division explained this. It wrote:

You can collect EI parental benefits if you are caring for a newborn child [citation omitted]. But you can only collect parental benefits within the parental benefit window. The parental benefit window begins with the week your child is born and usually ends 52 weeks later.

In some cases, the parental benefit window can be longer than 52 weeks. If your child was in the hospital [citation omitted], or if you are a member of the Canadian Forces who must return to duty [citation omitted], the Commission can extend the parental benefit window. The Commission can also extend the parental benefit window if you are collecting more than one kind of special benefits. [citation omitted]Footnote 13

[42] The General Division cited sections 12(3)(b), 23(2), 23(3) to (3.2) of the Employment Insurance Act.

[43] The General Division then applied these provisions to the facts, and determined that no further extensions were available to the Claimant. Other than the hospitalizations of his child, none of these other circumstances applied to him.

[44] The Claimant argues that he should be entitled to extensions much like his wife. She received compassionate care benefits, maternity benefits, and parental benefits. The Claimant says that she received 85 weeks in benefits. He says that she received parental benefits more than a year after their child was born.

[45] The Claimant says that if the parental benefit window ends 52 weeks after their child was born, then effectively his wife received benefits outside the parental benefit window. He says this should be available to him too.

[46] However, as the General Division noted, the parental benefit window can be extended if a claimant is collecting more than one kind of special benefit. This is what likely distinguished the Claimant’s case from his wife’s case. She received other special benefits in the form of compassionate care benefits and maternity benefits. She could avail herself of the extension provided under section 23(3.2) of the Employment Insurance Act.

[47] If a claimant is to get an extension under section 23(3.2) of the Employment Insurance Act, that claimant has to have been paid for more than one of the reasons mentioned in paragraphs 12(3)(a) to (f) of the Employment Insurance Act.

[48] I do not have all of the evidence regarding the Claimant’s wife’s claim, but she likely qualified for the extension under section 23(3.2) of the Employment Insurance Act because she met these requirements. She received compassionate care benefits and maternity benefits. The Claimant did not receive other special benefits so he could not receive an extension under section 23(3.2) of the Employment Insurance Act.

[49] The General Division identified the applicable laws and gave a legal justification for its decision. For this reason, I am not satisfied that there is an arguable case that the General Division did not have any legal justification to deny the Claimant a further extension of the parental window.

Conclusion

[50] I am not satisfied that the appeal has a reasonable chance of success. Permission to appeal is refused. This means that the appeal will not be going ahead.

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